Additional Information
Book Details
Abstract
Using a mix of quantitative methods and case study research, this book critically assesses the impact of party governments in different institutional settings on welfare state generosity and labour market reforms. Its key findings contradict earlier established views on the impact of leftist governments on welfare state policies. Specifically, left-wing governments are pursuing clientelistic policies when facing high institutional constraints and austerity and turn out to cater towards the core workforce rather than designing policies for the full range of labour market participants.
While existing scholarship often only looks at spending cutbacks or increases, Hübscheranalyses welfare reforms as instruments used by political parties to include and exclude electoral constituencies. Coupling an innovative theoretical framework focusing on party politics with a rare combination of quantitative analyses and case studies, this will be essential reading for welfare state scholars.
Alexandre Afonso, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Leiden University
Evelyne Hübscher’s excellent and timely book challenges the emerging consensus in the literature that parties no longer matter in welfare state policy-making. She demonstrates not only that left and right governments still leave their imprint on welfare-state reforms but also that left-wing governments facing high institutional constraints tend to protect the interests of their core electorates at the expense of labour market outsiders. This argument offers new perspectives on the electoral decline of social democracy and the rise of populist challenger parties.
Oliver Treib, Professor of Political Science, University of Münster
The Clientelistic Turn in Welfare State Policy-Making offers the most comprehensive treatment of the strategic dilemmas party governments face in times of fiscal austerity. Evelyne Hübscher provides a compelling account of social welfare policymaking that explains why labor market insiders still enjoy generous welfare entitlements, while poorer groups have turned to more extreme left or populist parties.
Despina Alexiadou, Chancellor's Fellow, School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde
Evelyne Hübscher is Associate Professor at the School of Public Policy. She teaches courses related to public policy, policy analysis, party politics, and welfare states.
Evelyne Hübscher elegantly links the literature on social and fiscal reforms with insights from insider-outsider politics. The remarkable, and worrisome result is a return of clientelistic politics as left parties cater increasingly to core electorates leaving real outsiders behind. An authoritative analysis for all comparative political economists working on these issues.
Achim Kemmerling, Gerhard Haniel Professor of Public Policy and International Development, Erfurt Universität
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
The Clientelistic Turn in Welfare State Policy-Making | Cover | ||
Contents | v | ||
List of Tables | vii | ||
List of Figures | ix | ||
Preface | x | ||
1 Yes, They Can – Partisan Impact on Welfare State Change | 1 | ||
1.1 Party Governments and Their Influence on Welfare States – Outline of the Argument | 6 | ||
1.2 Key Findings and Contributions of the Book | 10 | ||
1.3 Organisation of the Book | 13 | ||
2 The Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment – A Re-Assessment | 15 | ||
2.1 Opposing Views on Retrenchment and Welfare State Reforms | 15 | ||
2.2 Ideological or Strategic Policy-Making? An Assessment of Contradictory Theories | 18 | ||
2.3 Chapter Appendix | 31 | ||
3 Party Politics and Political Constraints | 36 | ||
3.1 Changing Demands for Social Policies and Social Protection | 38 | ||
3.2 The Role of Social Policy in Political Competition | 45 | ||
3.3 Party Governments, Political Constraints and Welfare State Reforms | 46 | ||
4 Austerity, Party Governments and Welfare State Output | 58 | ||
4.1 Estimation Technique and Basic Empirical Model | 58 | ||
4.2 Discussion of the Results | 62 | ||
4.3 The Modifying Effect of Political Constraints | 66 | ||
4.4 Changing Patterns of Partisan Effects over Time? | 73 | ||
4.5 Conclusion | 74 | ||
5 The Mechanisms of Clientelistic Politics – Case Study Framework | 78 | ||
5.1 Selection of Countries | 79 | ||
5.2 Selection of Reforms | 83 | ||
6 Germany | 90 | ||
6.1 Welfare System and Labour Market | 90 | ||
6.2 Institutional Framework and Political Actors | 92 | ||
6.3 Economic Context of Labour Market Policy-Making (from 1970s until the Mid-1990s) | 95 | ||
6.4 Analysis of Recent Labour Market Reforms | 98 | ||
6.5 Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz (BeschfG1994) | 102 | ||
6.6 Gesetz zur Reform der Arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumente 2001 (JobAQTIV) | 113 | ||
6.7 Discussion and Outlook | 124 | ||
7 Ireland | 135 | ||
7.1 Welfare System and Labour Market | 135 | ||
7.2 Institutional Framework and Political Actors | 138 | ||
7.3 Economic Context of Labour Market Policy-Making (from 1970s until the Mid-1990s) | 142 | ||
7.4 Analysis of Recent Labour Market Reforms | 146 | ||
7.5 Financial Act and Social Welfare Act 1996 | 150 | ||
7.6 Financial Act and Social Welfare Act 2001 | 162 | ||
7.7 Discussion and Outlook | 170 | ||
8 Discussion and Conclusion | 180 | ||
8.1 Contextualisation of the Results | 181 | ||
8.2 Main Findings and Implications | 186 | ||
8.3 Concluding Remarks | 196 | ||
Bibliography | 202 | ||
Index | 223 | ||
About the Author | 233 |