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Collectivity

Collectivity

Kendy M. Hess | Violetta Igneski | Tracy Isaacs

(2018)

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Book Details

Abstract

Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice brings new voices and new approaches to under-developed areas in the philosophical literature on collectives and collective action. The essays in this volume introduce and explore a range of topics that fall under the more general concept of collectivity, including collective ontology, collective action, collective obligation, and collective responsibility. A number of the chapters link collectivity directly to significant issues of social justice.

The volume addresses a variety of questions including the ontology and taxonomy of social groups and other collective entities, ethical frameworks for understanding the nature and extent of individual and collective moral obligations, and applications of these conceptual explorations to oppressive social practices like mass incarceration, climate change, and global poverty. The essays draw on a variety of approaches and disciplines, including feminist and continental approaches and work in legal theory and geography, as well as more traditional philosophical contributions.

Hess, Igneski, and Isaacs have assembled an exceptional collection of new papers exploring the issues of ontology, ethics and social justice with respect to collectives. Many of the chapters advance and deepen prior analyses of the way collective entities should be considered from the point of view of moral responsibility, practically and theoretically. Collectivity makes provocative moves in the direction of aligning moral assessment and ontological considerations with the real world of corporations, organizations, groups, nations, and other collectives that control much of the social, political, and economic events that shape our lives for good or ill.


Peter A. French, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Arizona State University
This is a very fine collection of essays by a group of prominent scholars who together both deepen our philosophical understanding of collective responsibility and open our eyes to the importance of taking oppression, group identity, and social justice seriously in ascribing of it.
Marion Smiley, J. P. Morgan Chase Chair in Ethics, Brandeis University
Tracy Isaacs is Professor of Philosophy, Women’s Studies and Feminist Research at Western University in London, Ontario, Canada. She is the author of Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (2011) and co-editor, with Richard Vernon, of Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (2011).

Kendy M. Hess is the Brake Smith Associate Professor of Social Philosophy and Ethics at the College of the Holy Cross.

Violetta Igneski is Associate Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Cover Cover
Collectivity i
Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice iii
Copyright page iv
Contents v
Introduction 1
Ontology 11
Chapter 1 13
Social Creationism and Social Groups 13
1. Feature Groups as Social Kinds 15
2. Social Kinds and Social Creationism 18
3. Organized Groups as Structured Wholes 22
4. Organized Groups and Social Creationism 24
5. Conclusion 27
Notes 28
Bibliography 32
Chapter 2 35
The Peculiar Unity of Corporate Agents 35
A Peculiar Unity 36
Material Existence 41
Conclusion 51
Notes 52
Bibliography 57
Chapter 3 61
Can There Be an Ethics for Institutional Agents? 61
Institutions and Their Minimal Moral Agency 62
The Difference Thesis 63
Agent-Based Ethical Theory and Institutions 64
A Problem for Agent-Basing 66
Generalizing the Problem 67
Objections and Responses 68
Institutions as a Subject of Ethics 71
An Ethics for Institutional Agents? 73
Notes 75
Bibliography 78
Chapter 4 81
At Cross Purposes 81
Setting the Stage: A Vignette of Disaster and Disappointment 82
An Opportunity Missed: The Gap between Expectations and Reality in the Enforcement Response to Lac-Mégantic 83
The Search for Answers: Understanding the Gap and Why It Matters 85
Getting to the Heart of the Matter: The Crucial Role of the Responsible Subject in the Assessment of Criminal Liability 87
Connecting the Capacities of the Responsible Subject to the Elements of an Offense 88
Building an Organizational Responsible Subject 91
Structure as a Means of Giving Substance to the Organizational Responsible Subject 93
From Theory to Practice: Applying the Organizational Responsible Subject to the Lac-Mégantic Case 95
Conclusion 99
Notes 99
Bibliography 103
Ethics 107
Chapter 5 109
Making Sense of Collective Moral Obligations 109
Meta-Criteria for a Theory of Collective Moral Obligations 110
Collective Moral Obligations as Obligations of Individuals 113
Collective Moral Obligations as Obligations of Groups 116
Collective Moral Obligations as “Shared” or “Joint” Obligations 123
Collective Moral Obligations from the Perspective of the Deliberating Agent 125
Notes 127
Bibliography 130
Chapter 6 133
Individual Duties in Unstructured Collective Contexts 133
Part 1: What Explains an Individual’s Moral Obligation in an Unstructured Collective Context? 134
Part 2: Individual Duties in a Collective Context 139
Conclusion 146
Notes 146
Bibliography 150
Chapter 7 153
Global Obligations and the Human Right to Health 153
1. Some Preliminaries 153
2. What the Existence of a Right to Health Need Not Entail 155
3. Correlative Obligation Bearers for the Right to Health 156
4. Against States as Correlative Duty Bearers 158
5. An Alternative—Correlative Obligations as Global Obligations 162
6. Developing the Global Obligations Account: Concerns about Agency 164
7. Addressing Some Objections 167
Notes 171
Bibliography 172
Chapter 8 175
When Are Collective Obligations Too Demanding?1 175
A Working Example 176
Preliminary Remarks 177
The Nature of Demandingness 178
Collective Obligations and Demands on Individuals 180
The Demandingness of Conditional Obligations 182
Explaining Reductive Collective Demandingness 184
Reductive Collective Demandingness and Multiple Implementations 185
Reductive Collective Demandingness and Non-Ideal External Constraints 187
Reductive Collective Demandingness and Increasing the Size of Collectives 187
Application of the Reductive Account of Collective Demandingness 188
Reductive Demandingness and Highly Structured Collectives 190
Conclusion 193
Notes 193
Bibliography 195
Chapter 9 197
Who Does Wrong When an Organization Does Wrong? 197
1. Organizations’ Distinct Wrongdoings 200
2. Limited Routes to Members’ Wrongdoing 203
3. A More Expansive Route 205
4. Application to Liberal Democratic States 211
5. Conclusion 215
Acknowledgments 216
Notes 216
Bibliography 218
Social Justice 221
Chapter 10 223
What Would a Feminist Theory of Collective Action and Responsibility Look Like? 223
1. Background: Feminist Philosophy, Collective Action Theory, and Theories of Collective Responsibility 224
2. Ontology 226
3. Ethics 230
4. Social Justice 232
5. Conclusion 234
Notes 235
Bibliography 237
Chapter 11 241
Identities of Oppression 241
1. Ideal Theory, Non-Ideal Theory, and Social Ontology 242
2. Oppression 250
3. Identity Categories 251
4. Elements of Sartrean Social Ontology and Oppression 253
Notes 259
Bibliography 262
Chapter 12 265
Resisting Oppression Together 265
1. Shared Intentions under Ideal Conditions 267
2. The Problem of Idealizing Conditions 269
3. Anti-Oppression Movements and Actions 275
4. AOAs and Non-Ideal Epistemic Conditions 277
5. Conclusion 283
Notes 284
Bibliography 288
Chapter 13 291
Geographically Gated Communities 291
1. The Global Rise of Gated Communities 292
2. Geographically Gated Communities: Two Case Studies 293
3. Collective Participation 296
4. Variations of Participation 300
5. A New Way Forward 306
6. Conclusion 308
Acknowledgments 308
Notes 308
Bibliography 313
Index 319
About the Contributors 331