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Abstract
Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice brings new voices and new approaches to under-developed areas in the philosophical literature on collectives and collective action. The essays in this volume introduce and explore a range of topics that fall under the more general concept of collectivity, including collective ontology, collective action, collective obligation, and collective responsibility. A number of the chapters link collectivity directly to significant issues of social justice.
The volume addresses a variety of questions including the ontology and taxonomy of social groups and other collective entities, ethical frameworks for understanding the nature and extent of individual and collective moral obligations, and applications of these conceptual explorations to oppressive social practices like mass incarceration, climate change, and global poverty. The essays draw on a variety of approaches and disciplines, including feminist and continental approaches and work in legal theory and geography, as well as more traditional philosophical contributions.
Hess, Igneski, and Isaacs have assembled an exceptional collection of new papers exploring the issues of ontology, ethics and social justice with respect to collectives. Many of the chapters advance and deepen prior analyses of the way collective entities should be considered from the point of view of moral responsibility, practically and theoretically. Collectivity makes provocative moves in the direction of aligning moral assessment and ontological considerations with the real world of corporations, organizations, groups, nations, and other collectives that control much of the social, political, and economic events that shape our lives for good or ill.
Peter A. French, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Arizona State University
This is a very fine collection of essays by a group of prominent scholars who together both deepen our philosophical understanding of collective responsibility and open our eyes to the importance of taking oppression, group identity, and social justice seriously in ascribing of it.
Marion Smiley, J. P. Morgan Chase Chair in Ethics, Brandeis University
Tracy Isaacs is Professor of Philosophy, Women’s Studies and Feminist Research at Western University in London, Ontario, Canada. She is the author of Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (2011) and co-editor, with Richard Vernon, of Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (2011).
Kendy M. Hess is the Brake Smith Associate Professor of Social Philosophy and Ethics at the College of the Holy Cross.
Violetta Igneski is Associate Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University.
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Cover | Cover | ||
Collectivity | i | ||
Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice | iii | ||
Copyright page | iv | ||
Contents | v | ||
Introduction | 1 | ||
Ontology | 11 | ||
Chapter 1 | 13 | ||
Social Creationism and Social Groups | 13 | ||
1. Feature Groups as Social Kinds | 15 | ||
2. Social Kinds and Social Creationism | 18 | ||
3. Organized Groups as Structured Wholes | 22 | ||
4. Organized Groups and Social Creationism | 24 | ||
5. Conclusion | 27 | ||
Notes | 28 | ||
Bibliography | 32 | ||
Chapter 2 | 35 | ||
The Peculiar Unity of Corporate Agents | 35 | ||
A Peculiar Unity | 36 | ||
Material Existence | 41 | ||
Conclusion | 51 | ||
Notes | 52 | ||
Bibliography | 57 | ||
Chapter 3 | 61 | ||
Can There Be an Ethics for Institutional Agents? | 61 | ||
Institutions and Their Minimal Moral Agency | 62 | ||
The Difference Thesis | 63 | ||
Agent-Based Ethical Theory and Institutions | 64 | ||
A Problem for Agent-Basing | 66 | ||
Generalizing the Problem | 67 | ||
Objections and Responses | 68 | ||
Institutions as a Subject of Ethics | 71 | ||
An Ethics for Institutional Agents? | 73 | ||
Notes | 75 | ||
Bibliography | 78 | ||
Chapter 4 | 81 | ||
At Cross Purposes | 81 | ||
Setting the Stage: A Vignette of Disaster and Disappointment | 82 | ||
An Opportunity Missed: The Gap between Expectations and Reality in the Enforcement Response to Lac-Mégantic | 83 | ||
The Search for Answers: Understanding the Gap and Why It Matters | 85 | ||
Getting to the Heart of the Matter: The Crucial Role of the Responsible Subject in the Assessment of Criminal Liability | 87 | ||
Connecting the Capacities of the Responsible Subject to the Elements of an Offense | 88 | ||
Building an Organizational Responsible Subject | 91 | ||
Structure as a Means of Giving Substance to the Organizational Responsible Subject | 93 | ||
From Theory to Practice: Applying the Organizational Responsible Subject to the Lac-Mégantic Case | 95 | ||
Conclusion | 99 | ||
Notes | 99 | ||
Bibliography | 103 | ||
Ethics | 107 | ||
Chapter 5 | 109 | ||
Making Sense of Collective Moral Obligations | 109 | ||
Meta-Criteria for a Theory of Collective Moral Obligations | 110 | ||
Collective Moral Obligations as Obligations of Individuals | 113 | ||
Collective Moral Obligations as Obligations of Groups | 116 | ||
Collective Moral Obligations as “Shared” or “Joint” Obligations | 123 | ||
Collective Moral Obligations from the Perspective of the Deliberating Agent | 125 | ||
Notes | 127 | ||
Bibliography | 130 | ||
Chapter 6 | 133 | ||
Individual Duties in Unstructured Collective Contexts | 133 | ||
Part 1: What Explains an Individual’s Moral Obligation in an Unstructured Collective Context? | 134 | ||
Part 2: Individual Duties in a Collective Context | 139 | ||
Conclusion | 146 | ||
Notes | 146 | ||
Bibliography | 150 | ||
Chapter 7 | 153 | ||
Global Obligations and the Human Right to Health | 153 | ||
1. Some Preliminaries | 153 | ||
2. What the Existence of a Right to Health Need Not Entail | 155 | ||
3. Correlative Obligation Bearers for the Right to Health | 156 | ||
4. Against States as Correlative Duty Bearers | 158 | ||
5. An Alternative—Correlative Obligations as Global Obligations | 162 | ||
6. Developing the Global Obligations Account: Concerns about Agency | 164 | ||
7. Addressing Some Objections | 167 | ||
Notes | 171 | ||
Bibliography | 172 | ||
Chapter 8 | 175 | ||
When Are Collective Obligations Too Demanding?1 | 175 | ||
A Working Example | 176 | ||
Preliminary Remarks | 177 | ||
The Nature of Demandingness | 178 | ||
Collective Obligations and Demands on Individuals | 180 | ||
The Demandingness of Conditional Obligations | 182 | ||
Explaining Reductive Collective Demandingness | 184 | ||
Reductive Collective Demandingness and Multiple Implementations | 185 | ||
Reductive Collective Demandingness and Non-Ideal External Constraints | 187 | ||
Reductive Collective Demandingness and Increasing the Size of Collectives | 187 | ||
Application of the Reductive Account of Collective Demandingness | 188 | ||
Reductive Demandingness and Highly Structured Collectives | 190 | ||
Conclusion | 193 | ||
Notes | 193 | ||
Bibliography | 195 | ||
Chapter 9 | 197 | ||
Who Does Wrong When an Organization Does Wrong? | 197 | ||
1. Organizations’ Distinct Wrongdoings | 200 | ||
2. Limited Routes to Members’ Wrongdoing | 203 | ||
3. A More Expansive Route | 205 | ||
4. Application to Liberal Democratic States | 211 | ||
5. Conclusion | 215 | ||
Acknowledgments | 216 | ||
Notes | 216 | ||
Bibliography | 218 | ||
Social Justice | 221 | ||
Chapter 10 | 223 | ||
What Would a Feminist Theory of Collective Action and Responsibility Look Like? | 223 | ||
1. Background: Feminist Philosophy, Collective Action Theory, and Theories of Collective Responsibility | 224 | ||
2. Ontology | 226 | ||
3. Ethics | 230 | ||
4. Social Justice | 232 | ||
5. Conclusion | 234 | ||
Notes | 235 | ||
Bibliography | 237 | ||
Chapter 11 | 241 | ||
Identities of Oppression | 241 | ||
1. Ideal Theory, Non-Ideal Theory, and Social Ontology | 242 | ||
2. Oppression | 250 | ||
3. Identity Categories | 251 | ||
4. Elements of Sartrean Social Ontology and Oppression | 253 | ||
Notes | 259 | ||
Bibliography | 262 | ||
Chapter 12 | 265 | ||
Resisting Oppression Together | 265 | ||
1. Shared Intentions under Ideal Conditions | 267 | ||
2. The Problem of Idealizing Conditions | 269 | ||
3. Anti-Oppression Movements and Actions | 275 | ||
4. AOAs and Non-Ideal Epistemic Conditions | 277 | ||
5. Conclusion | 283 | ||
Notes | 284 | ||
Bibliography | 288 | ||
Chapter 13 | 291 | ||
Geographically Gated Communities | 291 | ||
1. The Global Rise of Gated Communities | 292 | ||
2. Geographically Gated Communities: Two Case Studies | 293 | ||
3. Collective Participation | 296 | ||
4. Variations of Participation | 300 | ||
5. A New Way Forward | 306 | ||
6. Conclusion | 308 | ||
Acknowledgments | 308 | ||
Notes | 308 | ||
Bibliography | 313 | ||
Index | 319 | ||
About the Contributors | 331 |