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Preventing Chemical Weapons

Preventing Chemical Weapons

Michael Crowley | Malcolm Dando | Lijun Shang

(2018)

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Abstract

The life and chemical sciences are in the midst of a period of rapid and revolutionary transformation that will undoubtedly bring societal benefits but also have potentially malign applications, notably in the development of chemical weapons. Such concerns are exacerbated by the unstable international security environment and the changing nature of armed conflict, which could fuel a desire by certain States to retain and use existing chemical weapons, as well as increase State interest in creating new weapons; whilst a broader range of actors may seek to employ diverse toxic chemicals as improvised weapons. Stark indications of the multi-faceted dangers we face can be seen in the chemical weapons attacks against civilians and combatants in Iraq and Syria, and also in more targeted chemical assassination operations in Malaysia and the UK.

Using a multi-disciplinary approach, and drawing upon an international group of experts, this book analyses current and likely near-future advances in relevant science and technology, assessing the risks of their misuse. The book examines the current capabilities, limitations and failures of the existing international arms control and disarmament architecture – notably the Chemical Weapons Convention – in preventing the development and use of chemical weapons. Through the employment of a novel Holistic Arms Control methodology, the authors also look beyond the bounds of such treaties, to explore the full range of international law, international agreements and regulatory mechanisms potentially applicable to weapons employing toxic chemical agents, in order to develop recommendations for more effective routes to combat their proliferation and misuse. A particular emphasis is given to the roles that chemical and life scientists, health professionals and wider informed activist civil society can play in protecting the prohibition against poison and chemical weapons; and in working with States to build effective and responsive measures to ensure that the rapid scientific and technological advances are safeguarded from hostile use and are instead employed for the benefit of us all.


Professor Malcolm Dando trained originally as a biologist (BSc and PhD at St. Andrews University, Scotland). After post-doctoral studies in the United States (University of Michigan and University of Oregon) he held UK Ministry of Defence funded fellowships in Operational Research at the University of Sussex during the 1970s. Since then he has worked on arms control and disarmament, particularly on chemical and biological issues (DSc. University of Bradford). In recent years this work has been focused on awareness raising and education of life scientists regarding dual use and biosecurity, for example in the Royal Society Brain Waves module on Neuroscience, conflict and security and Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical-Biological Weapons, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2015.

Dr Michael Crowley is an Honorary Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Division of Peace Studies and International Development of Bradford University, and is also Research Associate for the Omega Research Foundation. He has worked for 25 years on arms control, security and human rights issues, including with Amnesty International, the Arias Foundation, BASIC, as Coordinator of the Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project and as Executive Director of VERTIC. He has also previously acted as Chairperson of the Bio-weapons Prevention Project.

Dr Lijun Shang is an international lecturer in Medical Science at School of Chemistry and Biosciences, University of Bradford. He is also a senior academic visitor to Department of Physiology, Anatomy and Genetics, University of Oxford, and a visiting Professor to Northwest University, China. During the past two decades, his researches primarily focus on structural and functional studies on ion channel in health and diseases and their physical and mathematical interfaces. Recently this interest is developed onto evaluating the potential toxic effects of nanoparticles, including chemical agents, on human health and diseases, with particularly interests in understanding the underlying mechanism of these effects.


Just over a century ago the world witnessed the introduction of gas warfare on the battlefield of World War I in Europe. Thousands of soldiers were killed or injured with chlorine, and later with more toxic chemicals, in the horrible and inhumane trench warfare of WWI. Fortunately, in 1997 the international Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force, banning such weapons. Just over twenty years later, over 96% of declared chemical weapons stockpiles – over 72,000 metric tons in millions of weapons – have been safely and verifiably eliminated in eight countries, and 192 countries have now joined the CWC. Yet we have recently witnessed toxic chemicals, including chlorine again, used against civilian populations in Syria and Iraq, an assassination with VX nerve agent in Malaysia, and an assassination attempt in Britain. This new and timely volume by several well-known experts delves into the future of chemical and biological warfare, the contentious politics of arms control and disarmament, the impacts of converging sciences on the CWC and Biological Weapons Convention, and the role of civil society, including the scientific and industry communities, in strengthening such abolition regimes and building a world free of such inhumane weapons. I highly recommend it to all readers.
Paul F. Walker, Ph.D., Green Cross International and Coordinator of the CWC Coalition

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Cover Cover
Preventing Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Disarmament as the Sciences Converge i
Foreword v
Contents vii
Section I - Introduction 1
Chapter 1 - Introduction: Preventing the Re-emergence of Chemical Weapons 3
1.1 The Context 3
1.2 Concept for the Book 5
1.3 Holistic Arms Control 6
1.4 The Structure of the Book 7
References 9
Chapter 2 - The Changing Nature of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat 10
2.1 Introduction 10
2.2 Mass Casualty and Mass Effect Attacks 12
2.2.1 LTTE and the Bombing of the Colombo War Trade Centre 12
2.2.2 The 1994 Attempted Attack on Paris 13
2.2.3 The Provisional IRA and the London Bombings, 1992–97 13
2.2.4 Aum Shinrikyo 14
2.3 Relevant Elements of the Context of the War of Terror 14
2.4 Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 17
2.5 Implications for Future Security 18
2.6 Revolts from the Margins 19
2.7 Responses to the New Security Challenges 21
2.8 The Risk of CBW Development and Use in the New Security Context 21
2.9 Conclusions 22
References 23
Section II - The Chemical and Biological Weapons Prevention and Disarmament Regime Today 25
Chapter 3 - The Chemical Weapons Convention – Past Success, Current Challenges 27
3.1 Introduction 27
3.2 Key Concepts and Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention 30
3.2.1 Elimination of Chemical Weapons Programmes 30
3.2.2 Preventing the Re-emergence of Chemical Weapons 31
3.2.3 Resilience to the Hostile Uses of Toxic Chemicals 33
3.2.4 Chemicals for Peace 34
3.2.5 Managing Advances in Science and Technology 35
3.3 CWC Implementation – Successes Stories and Challenges 36
3.3.1 Overview 36
3.3.2 Elimination of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles and Programmes 37
3.3.3 Preventing the Re-emergence of Chemical Weapons 40
3.4 The Operation of the CWC and Science and Technology 54
3.5 The Future – Staying Relevant and Implementing Change 58
3.5.1 The Changing CWC/OPCW Environment 58
3.5.2 Political and Cultural Challenges 60
3.5.3 Operational Capacity, Competence and Knowledge 62
3.6 Convergence and Disarmament – Conclusions 62
References 64
Chapter 4 - The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 69
4.1 Introduction 69
4.1.1 Overview 70
4.2 Normative and Legal Evolution Pre-BTWC 72
4.3 Use of Biological and Toxin Weapons in History 74
4.4 Offensive Programmes 76
4.5 Evolution of the BTWC 78
4.5.1 From Entry into Force to the End of the Cold War 79
4.5.1.1 Relevance and Innovation 80
4.5.1.2 Article X and Peaceful Cooperation 81
4.5.1.3 Infrastructure of Support 81
4.5.1.4 Additional Understandings 82
4.5.1.5 Science and Technology 82
4.5.2 The Post-cold War Decade 83
4.5.3 Recovery, Revitalization, and Recalcitrance After 2001 84
4.5.4 Evolution in Retrospect 87
4.6 How Scientific and Technological Developments Have Affected the BTWC 87
4.6.1 Responding to Scientific and Technological Developments 90
4.7 Conclusion: the BTWC in Context 92
References 93
Chapter 5 - United Nations Mechanisms to Combat the Development, Acquisition and Use of Chemical Weapons 101
5.1 Introduction: Role of the United Nations in Maintaining International Peace and Security 101
5.2 Investigatory Mechanisms 103
5.2.1 UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism 103
5.2.1.1 Strengthening the UNSGM 104
5.2.1.2 Case Study: UNSGM Investigation of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria 105
5.2.1.3 Effectiveness of the UNSGM 106
5.2.1.4 Scope of Coverage 107
5.2.2 Ad hoc UN Investigatory Mechanisms 108
5.2.2.1 OPCW–UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in Syria 108
5.2.2.2 Scope of the Mechanism 111
5.2.2.3 Effectiveness of the Joint Investigative Mechanism 112
5.3 UN Mechanisms to Address Confirmed Chemical Weapons Development, Acquisition or Use 113
5.3.1 Iraq: UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 114
5.3.1.1 Effectiveness of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 116
5.3.2 Syria: OPCW–UN Joint Mission 117
5.3.2.1 Effectiveness of the OPCW–UN Mission 119
5.4 UN Embargoes to Halt the Development, Acquisition or Use of Chemical Weapons 120
5.4.1 Range of Items Controlled 121
5.4.2 Monitoring and Facilitating Implementation of Embargoes 122
5.4.3 Effectiveness of UN Arms Embargoes 123
5.5 UNSCR 1540: Combating the Development, Acquisition or Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors 124
5.5.1 Obligations Under UNSCR 1540 124
5.5.2 Scope of Actors, Agents and Delivery Mechanisms Covered 125
5.5.3 Significance of UNSCR 1540 Obligations 125
5.5.4 Mechanisms to Facilitate and Monitor Implementation 127
5.5.5 Current Implementation and Effectiveness 128
5.5.6 Effectiveness and Challenges Faced 129
5.6 Conclusions 131
5.6.1 UN Mandated Investigatory Procedures 132
5.6.2 UN Sanctions 132
5.6.3 UN Enforced CW Destruction and Demilitarisation 133
5.6.4 UN Measures to Combat CW Proliferation and Use by Non-State Actors 133
AppendixUN Arms Embargoes Introduced During The Period 1 January 1990–31 December 2016 134
References 136
Chapter 6 - International Legal Constraints upon the Weaponization of Toxic Chemicals 146
6.1 Introduction 146
6.2 Geneva Protocol 147
6.3 Chemical Weapons Convention 148
6.3.1 General Obligations 148
6.3.2 Definitions 148
6.3.2.1 Toxic Chemicals and Precursors 148
6.3.2.2 Riot Control Agents 149
6.3.2.3 Chemical Weapons 149
6.3.3 Use of Weapons Employing Toxic Chemicals in Armed Conflict 151
6.3.4 Use of Weapons Employing Toxic Chemicals in Law Enforcement 152
6.3.4.1 Riot Control Agents 152
6.3.4.1.1\rRCA Means of Delivery.Since the use of “riot control agents as a method of warfare” is expressly prohibited under the Convention... 153
6.3.4.2 Incapacitating Chemical Agent (ICA) Weapons 153
6.4 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 155
6.5 International Humanitarian Law 156
6.5.1 Introduction 156
6.5.2 Over-arching IHL Obligations Constraining the Weaponization of Toxic Chemicals 156
6.5.2.1 The Prohibition of Deliberate Attacks on Civilians, the Prohibition of Indiscriminate Weapons and of Attacks that do not ... 157
6.5.2.2 The Prohibition of the Employment of Means and Methods of Warfare of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary ... 158
6.5.2.3 The Protection of Persons Considered Hors de Combat 158
6.5.2.4 Requirement to Respect and Ensure Respect of International Humanitarian Law 159
6.5.2.5 Prohibition of Methods or Means of Warfare Intended to Cause Widespread, Long-term and Severe Damage to the Natural Envir... 160
6.5.3 Obligations to Review “New” Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law 161
6.6 International Human Rights Law 161
6.6.1 Introduction 161
6.6.2 Protection of the Right to Life and Restrictions on the Use of Force 162
6.6.2.1 Application to Riot Control Agents 163
6.6.2.2 Considerations Regarding Means of Delivery and Dispersal of RCAs 164
6.6.2.3 Application to Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons 164
6.6.2.3.1\rEuropean Court of Human Rights: Finogenov and Others vs. Russia.Case law in this area is limited. To date, there has been only o... 165
6.6.2.4 Employment of Toxic Chemicals in Judicial Executions 167
6.6.3 Prohibition Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 167
6.6.3.1 Application to Psychoactive Incapacitating Chemical Agents 168
6.6.3.1.1 Use of Truth Serums in Interrogation.Certain States have emp1396983920loyed psychoactive incapacitating chemical agents... 169
6.6.3.2 Application to Riot Control Agents 169
6.6.4 Obligations to Review and Monitor the Use of ‘Less Lethal’ Weapons 170
6.7 International Criminal Law 171
6.7.1 Introduction 171
6.7.2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 172
6.7.2.1 Case Study: Attempts to Ensure Accountability for International Crimes in Syria 174
6.7.3 International and Internationalised Courts and Tribunals 175
6.7.3.1 Case Study: The Anfal Trial of Iraqi Officials 176
6.7.4 National Courts 177
6.7.4.1 Case Study: Van Anraat Trial – Complicity in War Crimes 177
6.7.5 Conclusions 178
Acknowledgements 180
References 180
Section III - Advances in Chemistry and Biology 191
Chapter 7 - Convergence of Chemistry and Biology, and Nanotechnology 193
7.1 Introduction 193
7.2 Convergence in the Life Sciences 194
7.2.1 Advances at the Intersection of Chemistry and Biology 194
7.2.2 Biological Production Technologies for Chemical Products 196
7.2.3 Chemical Production of Complex Biomolecules and Highly Potent Chemical Ingredients 200
7.2.4 Potential Novel Agents 201
7.2.5 Advances in Medical and Other Countermeasures 204
7.3 Nanotechnology 206
7.3.1 Overview 206
7.3.2 Nanomaterials and Toxicity 207
7.3.3 Nanomaterials as Delivery Vehicles 208
7.3.4 Nanomaterials and Protection Against Chemical Weapons 211
7.4 The Impact of Convergence and Nanotechnology on the Convention 211
7.4.1 The Benefits 212
7.4.2 The Risk of the Emergence of Novel Concepts of Chemical Warfare 214
7.4.3 Stronger Protections Against Toxic Chemicals 216
7.4.4 Challenges for National Implementation 217
7.4.5 Impact on the CWC Verification System 219
7.5 Conclusions 222
References 223
Chapter 8 - Advances in Understanding Targets in the Central Nervous System (CNS) 228
8.1 Introduction: Implications of a Mechanistic Neuroscience 228
8.2 Selective Malfunctioning of the Human Machine 234
8.2.1 Parkinson’s Disease 234
8.2.2 Manipulation of Mammalian Memory 236
8.3 Mechanisms of Incapacitation 237
8.3.1 Old Agents 238
8.3.1.1 Psychedelics 238
8.3.1.2 Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 240
8.3.2 Current Agents 241
8.3.2.1 Dexmedetomidine 242
8.3.2.2 Future Manipulation of the Locus Coeruleus System 244
8.3.3 Novel Agents 246
8.3.3.1 Orexin 246
8.3.3.2 Oxytocin 248
8.4 Conclusions 251
References 253
Chapter 9 - Advances in the Targeted Delivery of Biochemical Agents† 259
9.1 Introduction 259
9.2 Areas of Convergence of the CWC and the BTWC of Relevance for Targeted Delivery Systems 260
9.2.1 Technologies of Relevance for the Targeted Delivery of Biochemicals 261
9.2.2 Agents of Relevance for the Targeted Delivery of Biochemicals 261
9.3 Aerosol Delivery 265
9.3.1 Aerosol Delivery of Microorganisms 266
9.3.2 Aerosol Delivery of Vaccines 267
9.3.3 Advances in the Aerosol Delivery of Therapeutics and Biochemical Agents to Specific Sites in the Body 268
9.3.4 Advances in Aerosol Delivery Devices and Techniques 271
9.3.5 Feasibility of the Aerosol Delivery of Biochemical Agents as Weapons 272
9.4 Viral Vector Delivery 274
9.4.1 Viral Vectors Most Suitable for the Delivery of Biochemical Agents 275
9.4.1.1 Adenoviruses 275
9.4.1.2 Adeno-associated Viruses 277
9.4.1.3 Lentiviruses 278
9.4.2 Feasibility of Using Viral Vectors for the Delivery of Biochemical Agents as Weapons 279
9.5 Artificial Viruses as Vectors for the Delivery of Biochemical Agents 280
9.5.1 Types of Artificial Vectors: Nanoparticles and Nanorobots 281
9.5.2 Feasibility of Using Artificial Viruses as Vectors for the Delivery of Biochemical Agents as Weapons 282
9.6 Conclusions 284
References 286
Chapter 10 - The Future of Chemical Weapons: Advances in the Development of Anti-plant Agents 293
10.1 Introduction 293
10.2 Anti-plant Weapons 295
10.2.1 UK Developments 297
10.2.2 US Developments 298
10.2.3 Aspects of Transatlantic Collaboration 298
10.2.4 Vietnam 303
10.3 Prohibition 304
10.4 Advances in Science and Technology 306
10.5 Conclusions 307
References 308
Chapter 11 - The Future of Chemical Weapons: Advances in Anti-animal Agents 312
11.1 Weapons Targeting Animals 312
11.2 Past Offensive Anti-animal Activities 313
11.2.1 German Anti-animal Weapons During World War I 313
11.2.2 UK Anti-animal Weapons During World War II 314
11.2.3 US Anti-animal Weapons During the Cold War 315
11.2.4 USSR Anti-animal Weapons During the Cold War 316
11.2.5 Non-State Actors and Anti-animal Weapons 317
11.3 New Hazards – The Impact of Scientific and Technical Developments on Anti-animal Weapons 317
11.3.1 Developments in Science and Technology Decreasing the Hazards 318
11.3.1.1 Understanding Disease and Intoxination 319
11.3.1.2 Detecting Disease and Intoxination 320
11.3.1.3 Diagnosing and Disease Surveillance and Intoxination 322
11.3.1.4 Preventing, Treating and Mitigating Disease and Intoxination 323
11.3.2 Developments in Science and Technology Increasing the Hazards 325
11.3.2.1 Acquiring Weapons Agents 325
11.3.2.2 Improving the Efficacy of Weapons Agents 325
11.3.2.3 Producing and Stockpiling Weapons Agents 326
11.3.2.4 Targeting, Delivery and Dispersal of Weapons Agents 327
11.4 Future Risks for Biochemical Anti-animal Weapons 328
11.5 Conclusions 330
References 331
Chapter 12 - Development and Hostile Use of Toxic Chemical Means of Delivery and Dispersal 332
12.1 Introduction 332
12.2 Improvised Chemical Delivery Mechanisms 333
12.2.1 Introduction 333
12.2.2 Chemical Improvised Explosive Devices 334
12.2.2.1 Ground-based Chemical IEDs 335
12.2.2.1.1\rDevelopment and Use of Ground-based Chemical IEDs: Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Related Organisations.Since the late 1990s, Al-Qa... 335
12.2.2.2 Chemical Improvised Rocket-assisted Munitions 337
12.2.2.2.1\rUse of Chemical IRAMs by Syrian Armed Forces.In its report covering July 2016–February 2017, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) ... 337
12.2.2.3 Aerial Chemical Improvised Explosive Devices 338
12.2.2.3.1\rThe Development and Use of Aerial Chemical IEDs by Syrian Armed Forces.The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) mandated to “establis... 338
12.2.3 Commercial Aerosol/Smoke/Fog Generators and Dispersal Devices 340
12.2.3.1 Afterburner Multipurpose Aerosol Smoke System 340
12.2.3.2 Air-borne Sarin Attack Employing Ad hoc Evaporation – Aum Shrinynko 341
12.2.4 Wide Area Spray Aircraft 341
12.2.4.1 Paraguay: Weaponised Use of a Commercial Agricultural Spray Aircraft 343
12.2.5 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 344
12.3 Wide Area Riot Control Agent Means of Delivery 346
12.3.1 Definition and Concerns 346
12.3.2 The Development and Marketing of “Wide Area” RCA Means of Delivery 346
12.3.2.1 Multi-barrel and Automatic Launchers 347
12.3.2.1.1 Iron Fist [United States].The US manufacturer, NonLethal Technologies Inc., has developed and as of November 2017 has ... 347
12.3.2.1.2 Vehicle Mounted 38 mm and 64 mm Automatic Grenade Launchers [China].In 2012, the China Ordnance Equipment Research Ins... 347
12.3.2.1.3\r30 mm Grenade Round and Automatic Launcher [Russian Federation].According to the 2009 English language version of the 2006 “Ordn... 348
12.3.2.2 Mortar Munitions and Other Large Calibre Projectiles 348
12.3.2.2.1\r120 mm Mortar Shell [Turkey].In November 2003, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that the Turkish (State-owned) arms manufacturer, ... 349
12.3.2.2.2 Mortar Shells, Heliborne-dispensed RCA Munitions and 500 kg Cluster Munitions [Russian Federation].A Russian company r... 349
XM1063 155 mm Malodorant Projectile [United States].General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems worked under the direction of... 349
12.3.2.3 Unmanned Aerial and Ground Vehicles 350
12.3.2.3.1\rModular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS) [United States].QinetiQ North America, Inc. (QNA) developed the Modular Advanced A... 350
12.3.2.3.2\rSkunk Riot Control Copter [South Africa].The South African company, Desert Wolf, has developed the Skunk riot control copter to ... 350
12.3.2.3.3 AVS 100/150 Drones with Multiple Purpose Payload Launcher [France].In November 2015, at the Milipol (Military & Police... 351
12.3.2.3.4 Eagle Eye Drone [Turkey].The Turkish company Yavascalar (YAVEX) developed the Eagle Eye Anti Riot Drone (Figure 12.5),... 352
12.4 Military Toxic Chemical Means of Delivery 352
12.4.1 Introduction 352
12.4.2 Syrian Chemical Weapons Munitions 353
12.4.2.1 Introduction 353
12.4.2.2 Indigenously Factory Manufactured Sarin Rocket 353
12.4.2.3 Foreign Factory Manufactured Sarin Rocket 354
12.4.2.4 Factory Manufactured Sarin Bomb 356
12.4.3 North Korea – a State Chemical Weapons Programme Outside the OPCW 357
12.4.3.1 Chemical Weapons Programme Overview 357
12.4.3.2 Conventional Munitions 357
12.4.3.3 Ballistic Missile Programme 357
12.4.3.4 Concerns Grow but Potential Chemical Weapons Holdings Remain Unverified 358
12.4.4 Islamic State Military Chemical Weapon Munitions 359
12.4.4.1 Introduction 359
12.4.4.2 Indigenous Industrial Manufacture of Conventional Munitions 359
12.4.4.3 Acquisition of Conventional Munitions 360
12.4.4.4 Islamic State Attacks Employing Conventional Munitions Filled with Toxic Chemicals 360
12.4.4.4.1\rIS Chemical Attack Employing Mortars.According to information gathered by Human Rights Watch,150 the Syrian Government, the Russ... 361
12.4.4.4.2 IS Chemical Attack Employing Rockets and Mortars.According to international media reports, IS forces carried out a che... 361
12.4.4.4.3\rIS Chemical Attack Employing Artillery Shells.On the morning of 21 August 2015, the Syrian town of Marea was the target of a che... 362
12.5 Conclusions 362
References 366
Chapter 13 - Advances in Poisoning Mechanisms, Biomarkers, and Drugs for the Prevention and Treatment of Traditional Chemical Weapons 380
13.1 Introduction 380
13.2 Research Progress on the Mechanism of Mustard Gas and Nerve Agent (NA) Poisoning 381
13.2.1 Research Progress on the Mechanism of Mustard Gas Poisoning 381
13.2.2 Inflammatory Response to Tissue Injury Induced by SM 382
13.2.2.1 Inflammatory Response to SM-induced Lung Injury 382
13.2.2.2 Inflammatory Responses to SM-induced Skin Injury 383
13.2.3 SM-induced Apoptosis of Tissues 384
13.2.3.1 Apoptosis of the Lung Due to SM Exposure 384
13.2.3.2 Apoptosis of Skin Cells Due to SM Exposure 385
13.2.4 DNA Cross-linking in SM-induced Tissue Injury 386
13.2.5 Oxidative Stress in SM-induced Tissue Injury 387
13.2.6 Conclusions 388
13.2.7 Research Progress on the Mechanism of NA Poisoning 389
13.3 Research Progress on SM Biomarkers and NA Poisoning 390
13.3.1 Research Progress on Related Biomarkers in SM-exposed Human Populations 390
13.3.1.1 In vivo Adducts 390
13.3.1.2 Inflammatory Response-related Biomarkers Interleukins (ILs) 391
13.3.1.3 Conclusions 392
13.3.2 Advances in Adduct Markers of NA Poisoning and Their Analytical Methods 393
13.3.2.1 Analytical Detection of in vivo Diagnostic Biomarkers for NA Poisoning 393
13.3.2.2 Conclusions and Prospects 395
13.4 Research Progress on Drugs Used in the Prevention and Treatment of SM and NA Poisoning 395
13.4.1 Advances in SM Scavenger (SM Disinfection Technology) 395
13.4.2 Oxidation Disinfection Technology 395
13.4.3 Photocatalytic Disinfection Technology 396
13.4.4 Drug Research on SM-induced Injury 397
13.4.4.1 Scavengers and Anti-oxidative Stress Drugs 397
13.4.4.2 Metal Porphyrin Compounds 398
13.4.4.3 Polyphenolic Compounds 399
13.4.4.4 Inflammation-based Drugs 399
13.4.4.5 SM Corneal Injury Treatment 399
13.4.4.6 Conclusions 400
13.4.5 Advances in Prophylactic Drugs and Treatment of NA Damage 400
13.4.5.1 Prophylactic Drugs 400
13.4.5.1.1\rAChE Inhibitors.Carbamate compounds can cause carbamylation of AChE active sites within a short period of time, thereby protecti... 401
13.4.5.1.2\rBiological Macromolecules.Biological macromolecules, such as most enzymes and proteins, have a certain role to play against orga... 401
13.4.5.1.3\rBuChE.Animal experiments have shown that high doses of human BuChE can antagonize up to 5.5 times that of the LD50 of soman or 8... 402
13.4.5.1.4\rParaoxonase-1 (PON-1).Organophosphorus compounds (OPs) are the substrates for catalytic biological scavengers; therefore, the pr... 403
13.4.5.1.5\rAChE-induced/Stabilized Peptide.AChE, which disrupts cholinergic signaling, is a target of organophosphate neurotoxic agents, an... 404
13.4.5.2 Drug Treatment 404
13.4.5.2.1\rAnticholinergic Drugs.Anticholinergic drugs are highly diverse and can be selected based on the type of poisoning and its progre... 404
13.4.5.2.2\rCholinesterase Re-activator.Oxime cholinesterase re- 405
13.4.5.2.3\rRe-activators that Penetrate the BBB.Oxime compounds (such as HI-6) can effectively re-activate AChE, but these have a very low ... 406
13.4.5.2.4\rOther Re-activator Drugs.Pyridine-based re-activators have been shown to re-activate phosphorylated AChE, but cannot effectively... 406
13.4.5.2.5\rAnticonvulsants and Neuroprotective Agents.Previous studies have confirmed that although benzodiazepine drugs have a clear antic... 407
13.4.5.3 Prospects 407
13.5 Conclusions 408
References 408
Chapter 14 - Current Challenges to Export Controls Related to Chemical Warfare Interdiction 418
14.1 Introduction 418
14.2 Current Export Control Measures for CW Interdiction 419
14.3 State and Non-State Illicit Procurement Attempts 426
14.3.1 State Events 426
14.3.2 Non-State Events 430
14.4 A Typology of Malicious Export Violators 433
14.5 Proliferation-sensitive Equipment 436
14.5.1 Production Equipment 436
14.5.2 Protective Equipment 438
14.5.3 Munitions and Delivery Systems 439
14.6 Proliferation-sensitive Production Software 442
14.6.1 Equipment-specific Control Software 442
14.6.2 Facility-wide Control Software 443
14.7 Proliferation-sensitive Chemical Agents 446
14.8 Proliferation-sensitive Information 448
14.8.1 Information on the Manufacture of CW-relevant Chemical Compounds 450
14.8.2 Dissemination Information: Models and Munitions 453
14.9 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 454
References 456
Section IV - Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament 475
Chapter 15 - The Future Chemical Weapons Convention – Out-dated Model or CWC 2.0 477
15.1 Key Challenges 477
15.2 Preserving the Integrity of the Prohibitions and Preventing the Re-emergence of CW 480
15.2.1 Challenges to Maintaining the Comprehensive Nature of the CW Prohibition 480
15.2.2 Challenges to and Opportunities for National Implementation and Verification 482
15.2.3 Challenges to Preventing and Responding to Hostile Uses of Toxic Chemicals 485
15.3 Challenges and Opportunities in International Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of Chemistry 488
15.4 Maintaining Organisational Strength, Leadership, Competence 489
15.4.1 Leadership 489
15.4.2 The OPCW as a Learning Organisation and Fit for Purpose 490
15.5 Conclusions – the Way Forward and Opportunities for Action by the Review Conference 491
References 493
Chapter 16 - Implications for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 495
16.1 Introduction 495
16.2 The Existing Context 496
16.3 Status Quo 499
16.4 Absorption 502
16.5 Mimicry 504
16.6 Innovation 506
16.7 Conclusion: Practical Responses to Convergence 508
References 510
Section V - The Role of Civil Society 515
Chapter 17 - Role of the Non-governmental Chemical Science Community in Combatting the Development, Proliferation, and Use of Chemical Weapons 517
17.1 Introduction 517
17.2 Developments in Science and Technology (S&T) 519
17.3 Education and Outreach: Part One12 523
17.3.1 Background: the General Challenge 523
17.3.2 The Relationship Between IUPAC and the OPCW in E&O 525
17.3.2.1 The Multiple Uses Project 526
17.3.2.2 Codes of Conduct 527
17.4 Education and Outreach: Part Two 528
17.4.1 E&O and the Future of the CWC 528
17.4.2 IUPAC and the Hague Ethical Guidelines Project 530
17.4.3 Condemning the Use of Chlorine as a Weapon 532
17.5 Conclusions 532
References 533
Chapter 18 - Role of the Non-governmental Life Science Community in Combatting the Development, Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons 536
18.1 Introduction 536
18.2 Fostering a Norm of Biosecurity 541
18.2.1 Biosecurity Education: Development of Content and Building Capacity 541
18.2.2 Implementation of Biosecurity Education and Outreach 545
18.2.3Promoting Competence: International Professional Certification in Biosecurity 548
18.2.4 Codes of Conduct 550
18.2.5 Review of Scientific and Technological Developments 550
18.3 Implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention 551
18.3.1 Promoting Awareness-raising and Education 551
18.3.2 Promulgation of Codes of Conduct 553
18.3.3 Science Policy Advising 554
18.4 Conclusions 556
References 557
Chapter 19 - The Role of the Non-governmental Medical Community in Combatting the Development, Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons 560
19.1 Overarching Ethical Responsibilities of Health Professionals 560
19.1.1 Medical Ethics and Scientific Research on Human Subjects 561
19.1.1.1 UK Chemical Weapons Research, Human Experimentation and Medical Ethics in the 1960s 562
19.1.2 Violations of Human Rights Law and Breaches of International Humanitarian Law 564
19.1.3 The SIrUS Project and the Review of New Non-kinetic Weapons 565
19.2 Medical Involvement in Chemical and Biological Weapons Development 566
19.2.1 Investigating Medical Involvement in Apartheid South Africa's CBW Research Programme 568
19.3 Law Enforcement Weapons Employing Toxic Chemicals 570
19.3.1 Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons 570
19.3.2 Riot Control Agents 572
19.3.2.1 Turkey: Gezi Park Protests and the Misuse of Riot Control Agents 572
19.4 Conclusions 575
References 575
Chapter 20 - The Role of Civil Society in Combating the Development, Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons 580
20.1 Introduction 580
20.1.1 Scope and Nature of Civil Society Engagement 581
20.2 Societal Monitoring and Verification 582
20.2.1 Open Source Monitoring and Analysis 583
20.2.1.1 Introduction 583
20.2.1.2 The ‘Yellow Rain’ Case 583
20.2.1.3 Civil Society Reporting and Analysis of Alleged Use in Syria‡ 584
20.2.1.3.1 Civil Society Reporting of Alleged CW Attacks.Allegations of CW use began appearing as early as April 2012 585
20.2.1.3.2\rCivil Society Analysis of Alleged CW Use.Using social media platforms to broadcast news from within Syria permitted commentary a... 586
20.2.2 Evidence Derived from Field Missions 587
20.2.2.1 Independent Investigations of the Use of Chemical Weapons Against the Kurdish Population 588
20.2.2.2 Identification of a New Riot Control Agent Used in the West Bank 589
20.2.2.3 Field Mission Documents the Widespread Misuse of Riot Control Agents in Bahrain 590
20.2.3 Employment of National and International Reporting/Transparency Mechanisms 591
20.2.3.1 The Sunshine Project 591
20.2.3.2 The Bioweapons Prevention Project (BWPP) 592
20.2.4 Targeted Science and Technology Tracking 593
20.2.4.1 Open Source Investigation of Dual Use Research Potentially Applicable to Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons Developme... 594
20.3 Promotion and Protection of Whistle-blowing 596
20.4 Track Two Scientist-to-scientist Relations 597
20.4.1 Introduction 597
20.4.2 The Chemical Warfare Study Group 598
20.4.3 Pugwash and the CWC 599
20.5 Engagement with the OPCW and CWC States Parties 599
20.5.1 Advances in Civil Society Access and Engagement During the Third Review Conference 600
20.5.1.1 Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition 601
20.5.2 Raising Compliance Concerns 602
20.5.2.1 Civil Society Investigations Led to the Destruction of Turkeyʼs Stockpile of 120 mm Mortar Munitions Containing Riot Con... 602
20.6 Facilitating More Effective Civil Society Engagement with the OPCW 604
20.6.1 Overcoming the State Security Paradigm 604
20.6.2 Ensuring Greater Access and Establishing Forums for Substantive Dialogue 606
20.6.3 Securing Funding and Resources 607
20.7 Conclusions 608
References 609
Section VI - Conclusion 619
Chapter 21 - Conclusions and Recommendations 621
21.1 Introduction 621
21.2 Stage One: Review of Scientific and Technological Developments and Their Potential Applications 622
21.3 Stage Two: Review of Relevant Control Mechanisms 624
21.3.1 Chemical Weapons Convention 624
21.3.2 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 625
21.3.3 United Nations Mechanisms 625
21.3.4 Relevant International Law 626
21.3.5 Civil Society 627
21.4 Stage Three: A Proposed Strategy for Effective Regulation 628
21.4.1 Chemical Weapons Convention: Recommendations for the Fourth CWC Review Conference and Beyond 629
21.4.1.1 Ensuring CWC Universalisation and Complete Destruction of all Existing Chemical Weapons 629
21.4.1.2 Maintaining the Comprehensive Nature of the CW Prohibition 631
21.4.1.3 Strengthing National Implementation and Verification 634
21.4.1.4 Preventing and Responding to Hostile Uses of Toxic Chemicals 635
21.4.2 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 636
21.4.3 UN Mechanisms 637
21.4.4 International Law Constraining the Weaponisation of Toxic Chemicals 639
21.4.4.1 International Humanitarian Law 639
21.4.4.2 Human Rights Law 639
21.4.4.3 International Criminal Law 640
21.4.5 Civil Society 640
Reference 641
Subject Index 642