Additional Information
Book Details
Abstract
The relation between changes in society over historical time and the concomitant transformation of a concept that depicts something of intrinsic value in that society is complex and contingent. Social Thought and Rival Claims to the Moral Ideal of Dignity attempts to see if we can get any closer to a rounded, three-dimensional view of dignity by drawing on the historical record, on philosophy and social thought more widely and, finally, on contributions that present dignity in a rather more public and political light. In thus tracing the fortunes of human dignity we find that it has not always been viewed as a straightforwardly laudable principle. Social Thought and Rival Claims to the Moral Ideal of Dignity examines the reasons behind what turns out to be, really quite pronounced, the ambiguous status of the idea and ideal of dignity.
Dignity has a remarkable resonance in contemporary life. It is used as a touchstone to mark out what is deemed good, right or proper. In all walks of public life dignity is invoked as having a talismanic power to distil the final essence of human existence. Yet, in such public discourse, largely uninformed by the signal role dignity has played in ethical thought, we rarely become acquainted with the source of dignity's imputed magical powers. ‘Social Thought and Rival Claims to the Moral Ideal of Dignity’ is a sustained attempt to rectify this oversight by following the fortunes of the idea of dignity from its humble origins until it comes to represent in our time a universal ethical ideal.
Beginning by tracing the source of dignity’s occult status from its earliest appearance in the life and thought of ancient Greece, ‘Social Thought and Rival Claims to the Moral Ideal of Dignity’ proceeds to identify dignity in the theological ethics of early Christianity through to the late Middle Ages, Renaissance and early modern period, where dignity appears for the first time in secular thought. The second part of the book picks up the growing debate in the Enlightenment and romantic period and from that point onwards concentrates on following closely the unfolding significance of the idea and ideal of dignity in the classical thought of philosophy and sociology and in more recent perspectives.
In exploring the legacy from such sources, ‘Social Thought and Rival Claims to the Moral Ideal of Dignity’ distinguishes dignity from other related ethical notions such as respect for persons, duty and compassion as they appear on the respective agendas of distributive justice, human (and animal) rights and natural law and citizenship. The course of the discussion illustrates just how wide ranging recourse to dignity has become as an ethical ideal and explores the reasons behind its resurgent modern deployment. Ironically, while the concept of dignity has, indeed, begun to feature in a range of recent public policy debates, insights from evolutionary psychology and biology tell a very different tale: that dignity is quite misconceived. ‘Social Thought and Rival Claims to the Moral Ideal of Dignity’ culminates in an analysis of the reasons behind dignity’s recently acquired negative connotation.
Philip Hodgkiss is a sociologist who has been drawn increasingly to moral philosophy and ethics to research the origins of the idea and ideal of dignity. He is the author of The Making of the Modern Mind (2001) and has contributed chapters to various collections and edited volumes.
‘In this illuminating and detailed exploration of the concept of dignity, Hodgkiss discusses it in relation to the history of moral thought from Ancient Greece to the present day. He provides us with an invaluable philosophical and political account of its development and of the challenges we face in pursuing a dignified life.’
—Ken McLaughlin, Senior Lecturer, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Cover | Cover 1 | ||
Front Matter | iii | ||
Half-title | i | ||
Title page | iii | ||
Copyright information | iv | ||
Table of contents | v | ||
Preface and note on text structure | vii | ||
Acknowledgments | xi | ||
Chapter 1-10 | 1 | ||
Chapter One Introduction: The Distinction of Dignity | 1 | ||
I | 1 | ||
II | 8 | ||
III | 11 | ||
Chapter Two Dignity, Freedom and Reason: From Ancient Greece to Early Modernity | 17 | ||
I | 17 | ||
Dignity as the Consummate Act of Reason | 17 | ||
II | 24 | ||
The Rationalists: Reason as Dignity in Itself | 24 | ||
III | 26 | ||
Dignity, Natural Law and the Constraint of Freedom | 26 | ||
Conclusion | 29 | ||
Chapter Three The Sense of Dignity in Moral Philosophy: From the Ethical Intuitionists to the Irrationalists | 33 | ||
I | 33 | ||
Moral Sense: Sympathy, Pity and Compassion as Counterparts to Dignity | 33 | ||
II | 37 | ||
The Legacy of Kant | 37 | ||
III | 42 | ||
Irrationalism: Passion versus Compassion | 42 | ||
Conclusion | 46 | ||
Chapter Four Marx’s Critique of Morality: Natural Law, the State and Citizenship | 51 | ||
I | 51 | ||
Natural Law Yielding to the State | 51 | ||
II | 53 | ||
Hegel and Marx: Natural Law, the State and the Citizen | 53 | ||
III | 57 | ||
Marx’s Conception of Dignity and the Critique of Morality | 57 | ||
Conclusion | 63 | ||
Chapter Five Classical Sociology’s Regard for Human Dignity | 67 | ||
I | 67 | ||
In the Realm of Morality: The Classical Sociological Interpretation of Dignity | 67 | ||
II | 73 | ||
Developing a Conception of Dignity in Action | 73 | ||
III | 76 | ||
‘The Ethical State’ and Dignity: Concern and Control in Three Dimensions | 76 | ||
Conclusion | 79 | ||
Chapter Six The Human Face of Dignity Reflected in Phenomenology and Existentialism | 83 | ||
I | 83 | ||
Beholding ‘the Other’: The Legacy of Phenomenology | 83 | ||
II | 90 | ||
‘Between’ You and Me: Facing Up to Dignity | 90 | ||
Conclusion | 96 | ||
Chapter Seven A Fresh Term for Dignity: Attending the Frankfurt School (Both ‘Old’ and ‘Young’) | 99 | ||
I | 99 | ||
The Critique of the Subject of Dignity | 99 | ||
II | 104 | ||
Habermas: Cooperation, Autonomy and the Supersession of Egocentricity | 104 | ||
III | 107 | ||
A Miscarriage of Justice? | 107 | ||
IV | 110 | ||
Language as the Medium of Dignity | 110 | ||
Conclusion | 113 | ||
Chapter Eight Notes Sampling Research and Practice: Making Dignity Work; Making Dignity Care | 117 | ||
I | 117 | ||
Initiating Recognition of the Dignity of Labour | 117 | ||
II | 121 | ||
The Emerging Focus on Dignity in Work | 121 | ||
III | 123 | ||
The Working Hypothesis of Dignity | 123 | ||
IV | 127 | ||
Making Dignity Care | 127 | ||
Conclusion | 132 | ||
Chapter Nine The Slighting of Dignity: The Critic’s Charter | 135 | ||
I | 135 | ||
Seizing the Moment to Round on Dignity | 135 | ||
Dignity Replacing the Moral Device of Honour | 135 | ||
Dignity and a Suspect Human Rights | 138 | ||
Dignity as Mistaken Design (the ‘Scientific View’) | 141 | ||
Excursus: Behaving with Dignity | 146 | ||
Conclusion | 151 | ||
Chapter Ten Conclusion: After the Recognition of Dignity | 155 | ||
I | 155 | ||
The Final Reckoning | 155 | ||
Being without Rhyme or Reason: The Further Recognition of Dignity | 155 | ||
Charting Any Reasonable Grounds for the State of Dignity | 161 | ||
End Matter | 167 | ||
Notes | 167 | ||
Chapter One Introduction: The Distinction of Dignity | 167 | ||
Chapter Two Dignity, Freedom and Reason: From Ancient Greece to Early Modernity | 168 | ||
Chapter Three The Sense of Dignity in Moral Philosophy: From the Ethical Intuitionists to the Irrationalists | 168 | ||
Chapter Four Marx’s Critique of Morality: Natural Law, the State and Citizenship | 169 | ||
Chapter Five Classical Sociology’s Regard for Human Dignity | 170 | ||
Chapter Six The Human Face of Dignity Reflected in Phenomenology and Existentialism | 170 | ||
Chapter Seven A Fresh Term for Dignity: Attending the Frankfurt School (Both ‘Old’ and ‘Young’) | 171 | ||
Chapter Eight Notes Sampling Research and Practice: Making Dignity Work; Making Dignity Care | 172 | ||
Chapter Nine The Slighting of Dignity: The Critic’s Charter | 173 | ||
Chapter Ten Conclusion: After the Recognition of Dignity | 173 | ||
Bibliography | 175 | ||
Index | 185 |