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Managerial Economics and Strategy, Global Edition

Managerial Economics and Strategy, Global Edition

Jeffrey M. Perloff | James A. Brander

(2018)

Additional Information

Book Details

Abstract

For courses in Managerial Economics.

 

A Problem-based Approach that Uses Modern Theories and Real-world Examples

Managerial Economics and Strategy uses real-­world issues and examples to illustrate how economic principles impact business decisions. Emphases on agency and contract theory, managerial behavioral economics, game theory, and pricing are especially valuable to future managers. In-text examples and boxed mini­-cases use actual data to illustrate the use of basic economic models, while Q&As pose important managerial or economic problems and demonstrate a step-by-step approach to solving them.

 

The Second Edition has been fully revised and updated to reflect new supply-and-demand curves and include discussions of corporate social responsibility, opportunistic behavior, and innovation. It also features new learning objectives, examples, end-of-chapter questions, and spreadsheet exercises.

 

MyEconLab® not included. Students, if MyEconLab is a recommended/mandatory component of the course, please ask your instructor for the correct ISBN and course ID. MyEconLab should only be purchased when required by an instructor. Instructors, contact your Pearson representative for more information.


MyEconLab is an online homework, tutorial, and assessment product designed to personalize learning and improve results. With a wide range of interactive, engaging, and assignable activities, students are encouraged to actively learn and retain tough course concepts.


Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Cover Cover
Half Title Page 1
Title Page 3
Copyright Page 4
Brief Contents 5
Contents 6
Preface 13
Chapter 1 Introduction 23
1.1 Managerial Decision Making 23
Profit 24
Trade‐Offs 24
Other Decision Makers 25
Strategy 25
1.2 Economic Models 25
Mini‐Case Using an Income Threshold Model in China 26
Simplifying Assumptions 26
Testing Theories 27
Positive and Normative Statements 28
Summary 29
Chapter 2 Supply and Demand 30
Managerial Problem Carbon Taxes 30
2.1 Demand 32
The Demand Curve 33
The Demand Function 36
Using Calculus Deriving the Slope of a Demand Curve 37
Summing Demand Curves 38
Mini‐Case Summing Corn Demand Curves 38
2.2 Supply 39
The Supply Curve 39
The Supply Function 40
Summing Supply Curves 41
2.3 Market Equilibrium 42
Using a Graph to Determine the Equilibrium 42
Using Algebra to Determine the Equilibrium 43
Forces That Drive the Market to Equilibrium 43
2.4 Shocks to the Equilibrium 44
Effects of a Shift in the Demand Curve 45
Q&A 2.1 45
Effects of a Shift in the Supply Curve 46
Managerial Implication Taking Advantage of Future Shocks 47
Effects of Shifts in both Supply and Demand Curves 47
Mini‐Case Genetically Modified Foods 47
Q&A 2.2 48
2.5 Effects of Government Interventions 49
Policies That Shift Curves 49
Mini‐Case Occupational Licensing 49
Price Controls 50
Mini‐Case Venezuelan Price Ceilings and Shortages 52
Sales Taxes 55
Q&A 2.3 57
Managerial Implication Cost Pass‐Through 58
2.6 When to Use the Supply‐and‐Demand Model 58
Managerial Solution Carbon Taxes 60
Summary 62
Questions 62
Chapter 3 Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis 67
Managerial Problem Estimating the Effect of an iTunes Price Change 67
3.1 Elasticity 68
The Price Elasticity of Demand 69
Managerial Implication Changing Prices to Calculate an Arc Elasticity 70
Q&A 3.1 70
Mini‐Case Demand Elasticities for Google Play and Apple Apps 72
Using Calculus The Point Elasticity of Demand 72
Elasticity Along the Demand Curve 72
Q&A 3.2 73
Other Demand Elasticities 76
Mini‐Case Anti‐Smoking Policies May Reduce Drunk Driving 76
Demand Elasticities over Time 77
Other Elasticities 77
Estimating Demand Elasticities 77
3.2 Regression Analysis 78
A Demand Function Example 78
Mini‐Case The Portland Fish Exchange 80
Multivariate Regression 84
Q&A 3.3 85
Goodness of Fit and the R2 Statistic 85
Managerial Implication Focus Groups 87
3.3 Properties and Statistical Significance of ‐Estimated Coefficients 87
Repeated Samples 87
Desirable Properties for Estimated Coefficients 88
A Focus Group Example 88
Confidence Intervals 90
Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Significance 90
3.4 Regression Specification 91
Selecting Explanatory Variables 91
Mini‐Case Determinants of CEO Compensation 92
Q&A 3.4 93
Functional Form 95
Managerial Implication Experiments 97
3.5 Forecasting 98
Extrapolation 98
Theory‐Based Econometric Forecasting 100
Managerial Solution Estimating the Effect of an iTunes Price Change 101
Summary 104
Questions 105
Chapter 4 Consumer Choice 108
Managerial Problem Paying Employees to Relocate 108
4.1 Consumer Preferences 110
Properties of Consumer Preferences 110
Mini‐Case You Can’t Have Too Much Money 111
Preference Maps 112
4.2 Utility 118
Utility Functions 118
Ordinal and Cardinal Utility 119
Marginal Utility 120
Using Calculus Marginal Utility 121
Marginal Rates of Substitution 121
4.3 The Budget Constraint 121
Slope of the Budget Line 123
Using Calculus The Marginal Rate of Transformation 124
Effects of a Change in Price on the ‐Opportunity Set 124
Effects of a Change in Income on the ‐Opportunity Set 125
Q&A 4.1 125
Mini‐Case Rationing 126
Q&A 4.2 126
4.4 Constrained Consumer Choice 127
The Consumer’s Optimal Bundle 127
Q&A 4.3 129
Mini‐Case Why Americans Buy More E‐Books Than Do Germans 130
Q&A 4.4 130
Promotions 131
Managerial Implication Designing Promotions 133
4.5 Deriving Demand Curves 134
4.6 Behavioral Economics 136
Tests of Transitivity 136
Endowment Effects 137
Mini‐Case How You Ask the Question Matters 137
Salience 138
Managerial Implication Simplifying ‐Consumer Choices 139
Managerial Solution Paying Employees to Relocate 139
Summary 141
Questions 142
Appendix 4A The Marginal Rate of Substitution 146
Appendix 4B The Consumer Optimum 146
Chapter 5 Production 148
Managerial Problem Labor Productivity During Recessions 148
5.1 Production Functions 149
5.2 Short‐Run Production 151
The Total Product Function 151
The Marginal Product of Labor 152
Using Calculus Calculating the Marginal Product of Labor 153
Q&A 5.1 153
The Average Product of Labor 153
Graphing the Product Curves 154
The Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns 156
Mini‐Case Malthus and the Green Revolution 157
5.3 Long‐Run Production 158
Isoquants 159
Mini‐Case A Semiconductor Isoquant 161
Substituting Inputs 162
Q&A 5.2 163
Using Calculus Cobb‐Douglas Marginal Products 165
5.4 Returns to Scale 165
Constant, Increasing, and Decreasing Returns to Scale 166
Q&A 5.3 167
Mini‐Case Returns to Scale for Crocs 167
Varying Returns to Scale 168
Managerial Implication Small Is Beautiful 169
5.5 Innovation 170
Process Innovation 171
Mini‐Case Robots and the Food You Eat 171
Organizational Innovation 172
Mini‐Case A Good Boss Raises Productivity 172
Managerial Solution Labor Productivity During Recessions 172
Summary 174
Questions 174
Chapter 6 Costs 178
Managerial Problem Technology Choice at Home Versus Abroad 178
6.1 The Nature of Costs 179
Opportunity Costs 180
Mini‐Case The Opportunity Cost of an MBA 181
Q&A 6.1 181
Costs of Durable Inputs 181
Sunk Costs 182
Managerial Implication Ignoring Sunk Costs 183
6.2 Short‐Run Costs 183
Common Measures of Cost 183
Using Calculus Calculating Marginal Cost 185
Cost Curves 186
Production Functions and the Shapes of Cost Curves 188
Using Calculus Calculating Cost Curves 190
Short‐Run Cost Summary 191
6.3 Long‐Run Costs 192
Mini‐Case Short Run Versus Long Run in the Sharing Economy 192
Input Choice 193
Managerial Implication Cost Minimization by Trial and Error 197
Mini‐Case The Internet and Outsourcing 198
Q&A 6.2 199
The Shapes of Long‐Run Cost Curves 200
Mini‐Case Economies of Scale at Google 202
Q&A 6.3 202
Long‐Run Average Cost as the Envelope of Short‐Run Average Cost Curves 203
Mini‐Case Long‐Run Cost Curves in Beer Manufacturing and Oil Pipelines 204
6.4 The Learning Curve 205
Mini‐Case Learning by Drilling 207
6.5 The Costs of Producing Multiple Goods 207
Mini‐Case Medical Economies of Scope 208
Managerial Solution Technology Choice at Home Versus Abroad 208
Summary 210
Questions 210
Appendix 6A Long‐Run Cost Minimization 215
Chapter 7 Firm Organization and Market Structure 216
Managerial Problem Clawing Back Bonuses 216
7.1 Ownership and Governance of Firms 218
Private, Public, and Nonprofit Firms 218
Mini‐Case Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises 219
Ownership of For‐Profit Firms 220
Firm Governance 222
7.2 Profit Maximization 222
Profit 222
Two Steps to Maximizing Profit 223
Using Calculus Maximizing Profit 224
Q&A 7.1 225
Managerial Implication Marginal Decision Making 225
Profit over Time 227
Managerial Implication Stock Prices Versus Profit 227
7.3 Owners’ Versus Managers’ Objectives 228
Consistent Objectives 228
Q&A 7.2 230
Conflicting Objectives 231
Q&A 7.3 232
Mini‐Case Company Jets 233
Corporate Social Responsibility 234
Monitoring and Controlling a Manager’s Actions 235
Takeovers and the Market for Corporate Control 236
Mini‐Case The Yahoo! Poison Pill 238
7.4 The Make or Buy Decision 238
Stages of Production 239
Vertical Integration 239
Profitability and the Supply Chain Decision 241
Mini‐Case Vertical Integration at Zara 242
Mini‐Case Aluminum 243
Market Size and the Life Cycle of a Firm 244
7.5 Market Structure 246
The Four Main Market Structures 246
Comparison of Market Structures 247
Road Map to the Rest of the Book 248
Managerial Solution Clawing Back Bonuses 249
Summary 250
Questions 250
Appendix 7A Interest Rates, Present Value, and Future Value 254
Chapter 8 Competitive Firms and Markets 256
Managerial Problem The Rising Cost of Keeping On Truckin’ 256
8.1 Perfect Competition 258
Characteristics of a Perfectly Competitive Market 258
Deviations from Perfect Competition 259
8.2 Competition in the Short Run 260
How Much to Produce 261
Q&A 8.1 263
Using Calculus Profit Maximization with a Specific Tax 264
Whether to Produce 264
Mini‐Case Fracking and Shutdowns 266
Managerial Implication Sunk Costs and the Shutdown Decision 267
The Short‐Run Firm Supply Curve 267
The Short‐Run Market Supply Curve 267
Short‐Run Competitive Equilibrium 270
8.3 Competition in the Long Run 272
Long‐Run Competitive Profit Maximization 272
The Long‐Run Firm Supply Curve 272
Mini‐Case The Size of Ethanol Processing Plants 272
The Long‐Run Market Supply Curve 273
Mini‐Case Entry and Exit of Solar Power Firms 274
Mini‐Case An Upward‐Sloping Long‐Run Supply Curve for Cotton 276
Long‐Run Competitive Equilibrium 277
Q&A 8.2 279
Zero Long‐Run Profit with Free Entry 279
8.4 Competition Maximizes Economic Well‐Being 279
Consumer Surplus 280
Managerial Implication Willingness to Pay on eBay 283
Producer Surplus 284
Q&A 8.3 286
Q&A 8.4 286
Competition Maximizes Total Surplus 287
Mini‐Case The Deadweight Loss of Christmas Presents 289
Effects of Government Intervention 291
Q&A 8.5 291
Managerial Solution The Rising Cost of Keeping On Truckin’ 292
Summary 294
Questions 294
Chapter 9 Monopoly 299
Managerial Problem Brand‐Name and Generic Drugs 299
9.1 Monopoly Profit Maximization 301
Marginal Revenue 301
Using Calculus Deriving a Monopoly’s Marginal Revenue Function 304
Q&A 9.1 305
Choosing Price or Quantity 307
Two Steps to Maximizing Profit 307
Using Calculus Solving for the Profit‐Maximizing Output 309
Effects of a Shift of the Demand Curve 310
9.2 Market Power 311
Market Power and the Shape of the Demand Curve 311
Managerial Implication Checking Whether the Firm Is Maximizing Profit 312
Mini‐Case Cable Cars and Profit Maximization 312
The Lerner Index 313
Mini‐Case Apple’s iPad 314
Q&A 9.2 314
Sources of Market Power 315
9.3 Market Failure Due to Monopoly Pricing 316
Q&A 9.3 318
9.4 Causes of Monopoly 319
Cost‐Based Monopoly 320
Q&A 9.4 321
Government Creation of Monopoly 322
Mini‐Case The Canadian Medical Marijuana Market 322
Mini‐Case Botox 323
9.5 Advertising 325
Deciding Whether to Advertise 325
How Much to Advertise 326
Using Calculus Optimal Advertising 327
Q&A 9.5 327
Mini‐Case Super Bowl Commercials 328
9.6 Networks, Dynamics, and Behavioral ‐Economics 328
Network Externalities 329
Network Externalities and Behavioral Economics 330
Network Externalities as an Explanation for Monopolies 330
Mini‐Case Critical Mass and eBay 331
Managerial Implication Introductory Prices 331
Managerial Solution Brand‐Name and Generic Drugs 332
Summary 333
Questions 334
Chapter 10 Pricing with Market Power 338
Managerial Problem Sale Prices 338
10.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination 340
Why Price Discrimination Pays 340
Mini‐Case Disneyland Pricing 342
Which Firms Can Price Discriminate 343
Managerial Implication Preventing Resale 343
Mini‐Case Preventing Resale of Designer Bags 344
Not All Price Differences Are Price Discrimination 345
Types of Price Discrimination 345
10.2 Perfect Price Discrimination 345
How a Firm Perfectly Price Discriminates 346
Perfect Price Discrimination Is Efficient but Harms Some Consumers 347
Mini‐Case Botox Revisited 349
Q&A 10.1 350
Individual Price Discrimination 350
Mini‐Case Google Uses Bidding for Ads to Price Discriminate 351
10.3 Group Price Discrimination 352
Group Price Discrimination with Two Groups 352
Using Calculus Maximizing Profit for a Group Discriminating Monopoly 353
Q&A 10.2 355
Identifying Groups 357
Managerial Implication Discounts 358
Effects of Group Price Discrimination on Total Surplus 359
10.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination 360
10.5 Two‐Part Pricing 362
Two‐Part Pricing with Identical Consumers 362
Two‐Part Pricing with Differing Consumers 364
Mini‐Case Available for a Song 366
10.6 Bundling 366
Pure Bundling 367
Mixed Bundling 368
Q&A 10.3 370
Requirement Tie‐In Sales 371
Managerial Implication Ties That Bind 371
10.7 Peak‐Load Pricing 371
Mini‐Case Downhill Pricing 373
Managerial Solution Sale Prices 374
Summary 375
Questions 376
Chapter 11 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition 381
Managerial Problem Gaining an Edge from Government Aircraft Subsidies 381
11.1 Cartels 383
Why Cartels Succeed or Fail 383
Mini‐Case The Apple‐Google‐Intel‐Adobe‐Intuit‐Lucasfilm‐Pixar Wage Cartel 386
Maintaining Cartels 386
Mini‐Case Cheating on the Maple Syrup Cartel 387
11.2 Cournot Oligopoly 388
Airlines 390
Using Calculus Deriving a Cournot Firm’s Marginal Revenue 393
The Number of Firms 394
Mini‐Case Mobile Phone Number Portability 395
Nonidentical Firms 395
Q&A 11.1 396
Q&A 11.2 398
Managerial Implication Differentiating a Product Through Marketing 399
Mergers 400
Mini‐Case Acquiring Versus Merging 401
11.3 Bertrand Oligopoly 402
Identical Products 402
Differentiated Products 404
11.4 Monopolistic Competition 405
Managerial Implication Managing in the Monopolistically Competitive Food Truck Market 406
Equilibrium 407
Q&A 11.3 408
Profitable Monopolistically Competitive Firms 408
Mini‐Case Zoning Laws as a Barrier to Entry by Hotel Chains 409
Managerial Solution Gaining an Edge from Government Aircraft Subsidies 409
Summary 411
Questions 411
Appendix 11A Cournot Oligopoly with Many Firms 415
Appendix 11B Nash‐Bertrand Equilibrium 417
Chapter 12 Game Theory and Business Strategy 418
Managerial Problem Dying to Work 418
12.1 Oligopoly Games 421
Dominant Strategies 422
Best Responses 423
Failure to Maximize Joint Profits 425
Mini‐Case Strategic Advertising 427
Q&A 12.1 428
12.2 Types of Nash Equilibria 429
Multiple Equilibria 430
Mini‐Case Timing Radio Ads 432
Mixed‐Strategy Equilibria 432
Mini‐Case Competing E‐Book Formats 436
Q&A 12.2 436
12.3 Information and Rationality 437
Incomplete Information 438
Managerial Implication Solving Coordination Problems 439
Rationality 439
Managerial Implication Using Game Theory to Make Business Decisions 440
12.4 Bargaining 441
Bargaining Games 441
The Nash Bargaining Solution 441
Q&A 12.3 443
Using Calculus Maximizing the Nash Product 443
Mini‐Case Nash Bargaining over Coffee 443
Inefficiency in Bargaining 444
12.5 Auctions 444
Elements of Auctions 445
Bidding Strategies in Private‐Value Auctions 446
Mini‐Case Experienced Bidders 447
The Winner’s Curse 448
Managerial Implication Auction Design 449
Managerial Solution Dying to Work 449
Summary 450
Questions 451
Chapter 13 Strategies over Time 456
Managerial Problem Intel and AMD’s Advertising Strategies 456
13.1 Repeated Games 458
Strategies and Actions in Dynamic Games 458
Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 459
Mini‐Case Tit‐for‐Tat Strategies in Trench Warfare 461
Implicit Versus Explicit Collusion 462
Finitely Repeated Games 463
13.2 Sequential Games 463
Stackelberg Oligopoly 464
Credible Threats 467
Q&A 13.1 468
13.3 Deterring Entry 469
Exclusion Contracts 469
Mini‐Case Pay‐for‐Delay Agreements 470
Limit Pricing 471
Mini‐Case Pfizer Uses Limit Pricing to Slow Entry 472
Q&A 13.2 472
Entry Deterrence in a Repeated Game 473
13.4 Cost and Innovation Strategies 474
Investing to Lower Marginal Cost 474
Learning by Doing 476
Raising Rivals’ Costs 476
Q&A 13.3 477
Mini‐Case Auto Union Negotiations 477
13.5 Disadvantages of Moving First 478
The Holdup Problem 478
Mini‐Case Venezuelan Nationalization 479
Managerial Implication Avoiding Holdups 480
Too‐Early Product Innovation 481
Mini‐Case Advantages and Disadvantages of Moving First 481
13.6 Behavioral Game Theory 482
Ultimatum Games 482
Mini‐Case GM’s Ultimatum 482
Levels of Reasoning 484
Managerial Implication Taking Advantage of ‐Limited Strategic Thinking 485
Managerial Solution Intel and AMD’s ‐Advertising Strategies 486
Summary 486
Questions 487
Appendix 13A A Mathematical Approach to Stackelberg Oligopoly 492
Chapter 14 Managerial Decision Making Under Uncertainty 493
Managerial Problem BP’s Risk and Limited Liability 493
14.1 Assessing Risk 495
Probability 496
Expected Value 497
Q&A 14.1 498
Variance and Standard Deviation 499
Managerial Implication Summarizing Risk 500
14.2 Attitudes Toward Risk 500
Expected Utility 500
Risk Aversion 501
Q&A 14.2 503
Using Calculus Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth 504
Mini‐Case Stocks’ Risk Premium 504
Risk Neutrality 505
Risk Preference 506
Mini‐Case Gambling 506
Risk Attitudes of Managers 507
14.3 Reducing Risk 508
Obtaining Information 508
Mini‐Case Bond Ratings 509
Diversification 510
Managerial Implication Diversify Your Savings 512
Insurance 513
Q&A 14.3 514
Mini‐Case Limited Insurance for Natural Disasters 515
14.4 Investing Under Uncertainty 517
Risk‐Neutral Investing 517
Risk‐Averse Investing 518
Q&A 14.4 518
14.5 Behavioral Economics and Uncertainty 519
Biased Assessment of Probabilities 519
Mini‐Case Biased Estimates 520
Violations of Expected Utility Theory 521
Prospect Theory 522
Managerial Implication Loss Aversion Contracts 524
Managerial Solution BP’s Risk and Limited Liability 524
Summary 525
Questions 526
Chapter 15 Asymmetric Information 531
Managerial Problem Limiting Managerial Incentives 531
15.1 Adverse Selection 534
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets 534
Products of Unknown Quality 534
Q&A 15.1 537
Q&A 15.2 538
Mini‐Case Reducing Consumers’ Information 538
15.2 Reducing Adverse Selection 539
Restricting Opportunistic Behavior 539
Equalizing Information 540
Managerial Implication Using Brand Names and Warranties as Signals 542
Mini‐Case Discounts for Data 542
Mini‐Case Adverse Selection and Remanufactured Goods 544
15.3 Moral Hazard 544
Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets 545
Moral Hazard in Principal‐Agent Relationships 545
Mini‐Case Selfless or Selfish Doctors? 549
Q&A 15.3 549
15.4 Using Contracts to Reduce Moral Hazard 550
Fixed‐Fee Contracts 550
Contingent Contracts 552
Mini‐Case Sing for Your Supper 554
Q&A 15.4 554
15.5 Using Monitoring to Reduce Moral Hazard 556
Hostages 556
Mini‐Case Capping Oil and Gas Bankruptcies 557
Managerial Implication Efficiency Wages 558
After‐the‐Fact Monitoring 559
Managerial Solution Limiting Managerial Incentives 559
Summary 560
Questions 561
Chapter 16 Government and Business 566
Managerial Problem Licensing Inventions 566
16.1 Market Failure and Government Policy 568
The Pareto Principle 568
Cost‐Benefit Analysis 569
16.2 Regulation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets 569
Regulating to Correct a Market Failure 570
Q&A 16.1 572
Mini‐Case Natural Gas Regulation 573
Regulatory Capture 575
Applying the Cost‐Benefit Principle to Regulation 575
16.3 Antitrust Law and Competition Policy 576
Mergers 578
Mini‐Case Are Monopoly Mergers Harmful? 579
Predatory Actions 579
Vertical Relationships 579
Mini‐Case Piping Up about Exclusive Dealing 581
16.4 Externalities 581
The Inefficiency of Competition with ‐Externalities 582
Reducing Externalities 584
Mini‐Case Pulp and Paper Mill Pollution and Regulation 586
Q&A 16.2 587
Mini‐Case Why Tax Drivers 588
The Coase Theorem 589
Managerial Implication Buying a Town 591
16.5 Open‐Access, Club, and Public Goods 591
Open‐Access Common Property 592
Mini‐Case Spam 593
Club Goods 593
Mini‐Case Piracy 594
Public Goods 594
16.6 Intellectual Property 597
Patents 597
Q&A 16.3 598
Managerial Implication Trade Secrets 599
Copyright Protection 600
Managerial Solution Licensing Inventions 600
Summary 602
Questions 603
Chapter 17 Global Business 608
Managerial Problem Responding to Exchange Rates 608
17.1 Reasons for International Trade 610
Comparative Advantage 610
Q&A 17.1 613
Managerial Implication Brian May’s Comparative Advantage 613
Increasing Returns to Scale 614
Mini‐Case Barbie Doll Varieties 615
17.2 Exchange Rates 616
Determining the Exchange Rate 616
Exchange Rates and the Pattern of Trade 617
Managerial Implication Limiting Arbitrage and Gray Markets 617
Managing Exchange Rate Risk 618
17.3 International Trade Policies 619
Quotas and Tariffs in Competitive Markets 619
Mini‐Case Russian Food Ban 621
Q&A 17.2 624
Rent Seeking 625
Noncompetitive Reasons for Trade Policy 626
Mini‐Case Dumping and Countervailing Duties for Solar Panels 628
Trade Liberalization and the World Trading System 629
Trade Liberalization Problems 630
17.4 Multinational Enterprises 631
Becoming a Multinational 632
Mini‐Case What’s an American Car? 632
International Transfer Pricing 633
Q&A 17.3 634
Mini‐Case Profit Repatriation 636
17.5 Outsourcing 637
Managerial Solution Responding to Exchange Rates 639
Summary 640
Questions 641
Answers to Selected Questions 645
Definitions 657
References 662
Sources for Managerial Problems, Mini‐Cases, and Managerial Implications 668
Index 678
Credits 702