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Book Details
Abstract
Over the last decade, the internet and cyber space has had a phenomenal impact on all parts of society, from media and politics to defense and war. Governments around the globe have started to develop cyber security strategies, governance and operations to consider cyberspace as an increasingly important and contentious international issue. This book provides the reader with the most up-to-date survey of the cyberspace security practices and processes in two accessible parts; governance and operations. Suitable for a wide-ranging audience, from professionals, analysts, military personnel, policy-makers and academics, this collection offers all sides of cyberspace issues, implementation and strategy for the future.
Gary Schaub is also the co-editor of “Private Military and Security Contractors” (2016), click link for full details: https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442260214/Private-Military-and-Security-Contractors-Controlling-the-Corporate-Warrior
This compact volume includes some of the best scholarship in the field, providing a deeper understanding of the dynamics of cyberspace and cyberwar. The research and analysis here are essential reading to understand the important cybersecurity challenges facing the United States and the international community today.
Jason Healey, Senior Fellow for the Cyber Statecraft Initiative of the Atlantic Council and Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs
Does the US mature cyber as a strategic capability and become a world class player in this domain or cede the field to opponents and perpetually react to their actions? Gaining cyber dominance will be a long and arduous journey. The substantial gap between capability and policy will impede our rate of progress. A first step to narrow this critical gap and accelerate our journey is to read this volume, internalize the key challenges and broaden the debate across the policy, legal, privacy, information technology, military and intelligence sectors.
James Gosler, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University
Does the US mature cyber as a strategic capability and become a world class player in this domain or cede the field to opponents and perpetually react to their actions? Gaining cyber dominance will be a long and arduous journey. The substantial gap between capability and policy will impede our rate of progress. A first step to narrow this critical gap and accelerate our journey is to read this volume, internalize the key challenges and broaden the debate across the policy, legal, privacy, information technology, military and intelligence sectors.
James Gosler, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University
Long acknowledged as the fifth domain of military operations, cyberspace remains the least understood - a "place" where daily skirmishes involve nation-states, private corporations, and individuals on territory lacking the boundaries, rules, and doctrine that delimit the counterpart domains of air, space, land, and sea. The hard and necessary work of maturing cyber doctrine and practice will be built upon the careful scholarship such as that found in this volume - a must read for any who will operate in cyberspace, and all who will depend on their success.
Chris Inglis, Former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency
Recommended: A compilation of updated articles sourced from the US Air Force journal Strategic Studies Quarterly, this volume looks at cyberspace from a governmental and military standpoint, focusing on defense planning and strategy. Schaub (Univ. of Copenhagen) has edited a cohesive monograph on the topic, and contributors include an authoritative combination of academics and industry experts. While officially divided into two complementary sections, governance and operations, Understanding Cybersecurity seamlessly delves first into the philosophical issues of governing a realm “bound only by the limits of human innovation” (p. 3), then looks at the logistical issues of governance, and finally discusses defense and operational strategy. With cyberspace now considered the “fifth domain” of security operations by the US Department of Defense, it stands to reason that the largest portion of this monograph presents a militaristic view of managing cyber conflict and planning for cyber warfare. While many current works approach cybersecurity from an information technology perspective, this work provides a needed academic primer on the philosophy and logistics behind how governmental agencies are creating policy in regards to cybersecurity and securing infrastructures against cyber threats.
Gary Schaub, Jr. is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies, Department of Political Science, the University of Copenhagen.
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Cover | Cover 1 | ||
Half Title | i | ||
Title Page | iii | ||
Copyright Page | iv | ||
Table of contents | vii | ||
Preface | ix | ||
The Future of Things Cyber | xi | ||
Chapter One Internet Governance and National Security | 1 | ||
Internet Governance and U.S. National Cyber Strategy | 2 | ||
The Friendly Side of Cyber Conflict | 4 | ||
Multistakeholders and Internet Governance | 8 | ||
Critical Internet Resources and Infrastructure | 10 | ||
The ICANN and the Current Internet Governance Structure | 11 | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force: Stewards of TCP/IP | 12 | ||
Global Challenges to the Status Quo | 13 | ||
The (Potential) Tyranny of the International Telecommunications Union over Critical Internet Resources | 14 | ||
Shadow “DNS” Rising | 16 | ||
Conclusion | 17 | ||
Notes | 18 | ||
Chapter Two Managing Decentralized Cyber Governance: The Responsibility to Troubleshoot | 25 | ||
Decentralized Governance of a Global System | 27 | ||
Prohibition Regimes and International Security Governance | 29 | ||
Prohibition in the Cyber Domain | 30 | ||
Implementing Cyber Prohibition | 33 | ||
The Responsibility to Troubleshoot | 34 | ||
Coping with Unintended Consequences | 34 | ||
Relationship to Responsibility to Protect | 36 | ||
Implementing the Responsibility to Troubleshoot | 38 | ||
Conclusion | 43 | ||
Notes | 44 | ||
Chapter Three Tragedy of the Cyber Commons? | 49 | ||
Conceiving of the Cyber Commons | 51 | ||
Governing the Cyber Commons | 57 | ||
Size of Resource | 58 | ||
Number of Users | 59 | ||
Resource Unit Mobility | 60 | ||
Importance of Resource to Users | 61 | ||
Productivity of System | 62 | ||
Predictability of System Dynamics | 63 | ||
Leadership | 64 | ||
Norms and Social Capital | 65 | ||
Knowledge of the Resource and Its Users | 67 | ||
Collective Choice Rules | 67 | ||
Conclusions: Self-Governance in the Cyber Commons? | 69 | ||
Notes | 70 | ||
Chapter Four Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age 2.0 | 77 | ||
The “Westphalian” Process | 80 | ||
Practical Reinforcement—Borders Decrease the Ease of Cybered Offense | 83 | ||
Virtual Borders—Feasible, Comfortable, and Manageable | 84 | ||
Emergent Virtual Borders | 88 | ||
Cyber Command: The U.S. Model | 92 | ||
Resuscitation of International Relations Theory and History | 97 | ||
Conclusion | 100 | ||
Notes | 101 | ||
Chapter Five Blown to Bits: China’s War in Cyberspace, August–September 2025 | 109 | ||
A Strategic Lens for East Asia | 109 | ||
Asia’s Cyber (In)Security Problem | 111 | ||
Considering State Cyber Conflict—The China Scenario | 112 | ||
Laying the Field of Battle: A Clue of Cyber War to Come | 113 | ||
Lifting the Electronic Veil | 115 | ||
Computer Krieg | 116 | ||
U.S. Response | 120 | ||
Cyber War’s Role in the Trans-Asia War | 123 | ||
Reflection on a Conflict that Wasn’t | 124 | ||
Notes | 125 | ||
Chapter Six Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity? | 127 | ||
Cyberspace in Perspective | 128 | ||
Learning from one Revolution to Another? | 130 | ||
Some General Lessons | 132 | ||
Strategy for a New Technology Will Lack Adequate Empirical Content | 133 | ||
New Technologies Raise New Issues in Civil–Military Relations | 134 | ||
Civilian Uses Will Complicate Effective National Security Strategies | 135 | ||
International Cooperation Lessons | 137 | ||
Learning Can Lead to Concurrence in Beliefs without Cooperation | 137 | ||
Learning Is Often Lumpy and Discontinuous | 138 | ||
Learning Occurs at Different Rates in Different Issues of a New Domain | 139 | ||
Involve the Military in International Contacts | 140 | ||
Deterrence Is Complex and Involves More Than Just Retaliation | 141 | ||
Begin Arms Control with Positive-Sum Games Related to Third Parties | 142 | ||
Conclusion | 143 | ||
Notes | 144 | ||
Chapter Seven Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace | 147 | ||
Terminology and Basic Concepts | 147 | ||
Attribution | 150 | ||
The Need for Intelligence Support | 150 | ||
Active Defense | 151 | ||
Evolving or Escalating Conflict | 152 | ||
Crisis Stability | 155 | ||
Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict | 157 | ||
Determining the Impact and Magnitude of Cyber Response | 158 | ||
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures | 158 | ||
Catalytic Cyber Conflict | 159 | ||
Complications Introduced by Patriotic Hackers | 159 | ||
Incentives for Self-Restraint in Escalation | 161 | ||
De-escalation and Conflict Termination | 161 | ||
Kinetic Escalation | 164 | ||
The Political Side of Escalation | 165 | ||
The Future of Escalation Dynamics | 166 | ||
Notes | 167 | ||
Chapter Eight The Specter of Nonobvious Warfare | 171 | ||
When Is Warfare Nonobvious? | 173 | ||
Types of Nonobvious Warfare | 174 | ||
Cyber Warfare | 175 | ||
Space Warfare | 175 | ||
Electronic Warfare | 176 | ||
Drones | 176 | ||
Special Operators, Saboteurs, and Assassins | 177 | ||
Proxy Attacks | 177 | ||
Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction | 177 | ||
Intelligence Support to Combat Operations | 178 | ||
The Uses of Nonobvious Warfare | 178 | ||
The Target’s Response Options | 181 | ||
Assessment and Conclusions | 182 | ||
Notes | 183 | ||
Chapter Nine Act and Actor Attribution in Cyberspace: A Proposed Analytic Framework | 185 | ||
Defining Attribution | 186 | ||
The Basic Legal Framework | 186 | ||
Actor Attribution | 188 | ||
Act Attribution | 189 | ||
The Importance of Attribution | 190 | ||
The Difficulty of Conclusive Attribution | 191 | ||
An Analytic Model for Actor and Act Attribution | 194 | ||
Quadrant 1: Low Actor Attribution Confidence/Low Degree of Harm | 195 | ||
Quadrant 2: High Actor Attribution Confidence/Low Degree of Harm | 196 | ||
Quadrant 3: Low Actor Attribution Confidence/High Degree of Harm | 197 | ||
Quadrant 4: High Actor Attribution Confidence/High Degree of Harm | 197 | ||
Two Cases Briefly Examined | 198 | ||
Conclusion and Recommendations | 200 | ||
Notes | 201 | ||
Chapter Ten Strengthening Private–Public Partnerships in National Cybersecurity | 205 | ||
The Current Strategy | 206 | ||
The Evolution of U.S. Government Policy | 207 | ||
The Emerging Threat Matrix | 210 | ||
Legal Hurdles to Cooperation | 214 | ||
Antitrust | 214 | ||
Privacy and Confidentiality | 215 | ||
Robust Private–Public Partnerships | 218 | ||
Joint Planning | 218 | ||
Incentives for New Partnerships | 220 | ||
Who Defends Private Industry against Cyber Attack? | 221 | ||
Balancing Public and Private Interests in Allocating Cost and Sharing Information | 222 | ||
Conclusion | 223 | ||
Notes | 224 | ||
Bibliography | 233 | ||
Index | 259 | ||
About the Contributors | 267 |