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Abstract
Elinor Ostrom was the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in economics. She has been at the forefront of New Institutional Economics and Public Choice revolutions, discovering surprising ways in which communities around the world have succeed in solving difficult collective problems. She first rose to prominence by studying the police in metropolitan areas in the United States, and showing that, contrary to the prevailing view at the time, community policing and smaller departments worked better than centralized and large police departments. Together with her husband, Vincent, they have set up the Bloomington Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, which has grown into a global network of scholars and practitioners. Throughout her career, she was interested in studying ecological problems, and understanding how people manage communal properties. Her most famous discovery is that communities often find ingenious ways of escaping the “tragedy of the commons”. Analysing a wide-variety of successes and failures, and working together with many other scholars, she was able to uncover a series of institutional “design principles”: a set of criteria which, if followed, societies are more likely to be productive and resilient to shocks. Some of her most important theoretical insights, about polycentricity and institutional evolution, arose from this synthesizing effort. Furthermore, this led her to develop a framework for the study of the relationship between societies and their natural environment which brought institutional insights into the field of environmental studies.
Tarko’s concise intellectual biography of Elinor Ostrom provides readers with an authoritative account of the Bloomington School and is a masterful work of political economy in its own right. The fields of economics, political science, and philosophy would be far better off if Ostrom’s insights were more widely understood, and this book should help to make that happen.
Jason Brennan, Robert J. and Elizabeth Flanagan Family Chair and Associate Professor of Strategy, Economics, Ethics, and Public Policy, the McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University
[T]he book presents, in a systematic way, an excellent and easy-to-read exposition of the Ostroms’ approach to social science.
Vald Tarko has provided a brilliant overview of what Lin Ostrom often referred to as her and Vincent's "polycentric journey". Along the way she studied local public economies, the wrestling with common-pool resources throughout the world, and the complexity of economic development. Her enduring research legacy is to be found in both her multiple methodologies approach to studying institutional diversity, and the conclusions she drew on the possibility and sustainability of self-governing democratic societies. Tarko's book is a must read not only to those who want to learn about Elinor Ostrom and her contributions, but to all students of political economy.
Peter J. Boettke, Professor, George Mason University
This is a masterful account of Ostrom's work. An inspiring synthesis, of an inspiring intellectual life.
Mark Pennington, Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy, King's College London
Vlad Tarko's book adds a valuable perspective on the ideas and work of Elinor Ostrom plus that of Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington Workshop they established. The extent of their influence, and the reasons for it, come through clearly in these pages. It will be useful for readers looking for an introduction to Elinor's work, and enjoyable for readers who are already familiar with it.
William Blomquist, Professor, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
Vlad Tarko is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics, Dickinson College, USA.
Tarko does an outstanding job capturing the breadth and depth of Lin’s work to produce a course in the New Institutional Economics, as well as an intellectual history of Lin, Vincent and the many scholars associated with the Workshop in Political theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University.
Robert L. Bish, Professor Emeritus, Economics and Public Administration, University of Virginia
Vlad Tarko has written more than an intellectual biography of one of the most influential social scientists of her generation. His book is at the same time an insightful introduction and a nuanced interpretation of a fascinating research program with significant applied-level implications.
Paul Dragos Aligica, George Mason University
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Cover | Cover 1 | ||
Half Title | i | ||
Title Page | iii | ||
Copyright Page | iv | ||
Table of Contents | v | ||
List of Figures | vii | ||
List of Tables | ix | ||
Acknowledgments | xi | ||
Introduction | 1 | ||
Overcoming Prejudice | 3 | ||
Basic Principles of Institutional Economics | 5 | ||
What Are Institutions? | 5 | ||
Transaction Costs | 7 | ||
The Limits of Institutional Design | 11 | ||
The Role of the Expert | 14 | ||
Vincent Ostrom’s Contribution to the Alaskan Constitution | 14 | ||
The Expert as a Catalyst of Self-Governance | 15 | ||
Notes | 17 | ||
Chapter One Against Gargantua | 19 | ||
From Ucla To Indiana | 21 | ||
The Complexity of Public Services | 26 | ||
The Rise and Fall of Community Policing | 32 | ||
How Reliable Are Citizens’ Surveys? | 34 | ||
The Failure of “Community Policing” | 35 | ||
The Impossibility of Efficient Hierarchical Public Economies | 40 | ||
Control Over the Cause of the Problem | 42 | ||
Accurately Measuring the Demand for Public Goods and the Opportunity Cost of Providing Them | 44 | ||
Fiscal Equivalence and Redistribution | 46 | ||
The Separation of Production and Provision | 49 | ||
Notes | 50 | ||
Chapter Two Polycentricity | 53 | ||
A Few Examples of Large-Scale Polycentric Systems | 58 | ||
The Scientific Community | 58 | ||
Common Law | 61 | ||
Federalism | 62 | ||
Polycentricity as a Framework for the Analysis of Emergent Orders | 64 | ||
Complex Adaptive Systems | 65 | ||
Vincent Ostrom’s Polycentricity Conjecture | 67 | ||
Notes | 68 | ||
Chapter Three Escaping the Tragedy of the Commons | 69 | ||
Beyond Markets and Governments | 76 | ||
Civil Society Is a Real Thing | 77 | ||
The Hard Case: Common-Pool Resources | 78 | ||
What are Property Rights? | 82 | ||
Property Is a Bundle of Rights | 83 | ||
Self-Governance Depends on Mechanisms for Monitoring and Enforcing Rules | 86 | ||
Why State Solutions Often Fail | 87 | ||
The Complexity and Limits of Private Property | 89 | ||
Summary | 92 | ||
Bottom-Up Solutions to Social Dilemmas | 93 | ||
From Prisoners’ Dilemma to the Stag Hunt | 96 | ||
Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma Model | 99 | ||
Note | 101 | ||
Chapter Four Resilience | 103 | ||
Conceptualizing Resilience | 105 | ||
An Equilibrium Perspective | 105 | ||
Highly Optimized Tolerance | 106 | ||
The Problem of Self-Interested Actors Evading Rules | 107 | ||
Polycentricity as a Method to Design Resilient Systems | 108 | ||
Avoiding Slippery Slopes | 110 | ||
Entrepreneurship, Creative Destruction, and the Red Queen Race | 113 | ||
Summary | 117 | ||
Elinor Ostrom’s “Design Principles” for Resilient Systems | 119 | ||
The Operational Level | 121 | ||
The Collective Choice Level | 125 | ||
The Constitutional Level | 130 | ||
How General Are These Principles? | 132 | ||
Notes | 135 | ||
Chapter Five Hamilton’s Dilemma | 137 | ||
The Institutional Analysis and Development (Iad) Framework | 143 | ||
Action Arenas and Institutional Roles | 146 | ||
Evaluation of Outcomes | 150 | ||
Example: Socioecological Resilience | 152 | ||
Institutional Factors | 152 | ||
The Action Arena | 154 | ||
Patterns of Interactions and the Evaluation of Outcomes | 155 | ||
Institutional Evolution and Public Entrepreneurship | 156 | ||
Rules as the Basic Unit of Institutional Evolution | 157 | ||
Public Entrepreneurship | 158 | ||
Coproduction | 161 | ||
Building a Science Of Association | 165 | ||
References | 173 | ||
Index | 189 |