BOOK
Central Banking at a Crossroads
Charles Goodhart | Daniela Gabor | Jakob Vestergaard | Ismail Ertürk
(2014)
Additional Information
Book Details
Abstract
This book reflects on the innovations that central banks have introduced since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers to improve their modes of intervention, regulation and resolution of financial markets and financial institutions. Authors from both academia and policy circles explore these innovations through four approaches: ‘Bank Capital Regulation’ examines the Basel III agreement; ‘Bank Resolution’ focuses on effective regimes for regulating and resolving ailing banks; ‘Central Banking with Collateral-Based Finance’ develops thought on the challenges that market-based finance pose for the conduct of central banking; and ‘Where Next for Central Banking’ examines the trajectory of central banking and its new, central role in sustaining capitalism.
“This is the book finance experts have been waiting for. For those who seek concrete case studies and empirics on the transformative role of central banks since the financial crisis, this important volume amply fills this niche. This rigorous and novel investigation is a ‘must-read’ for all who either approve or disapprove of the unconventional instruments and practices used by central banks that have extended the mandate and blurred the traditional line between monetary and fiscal policy.” —Brigitte Young, University of Münster, Germany
“Focusing on solvency questions, this book provides a representative sample of the current state of debate, a first and useful step in the urgent project of reconceptualizing the role of central banking for the modern world.” —Perry Mehrling, Barnard College, Columbia University
“Big crises challenge our thinking and even entire paradigms of economics. Many of the authors in this volume are well known for their ideas for further regulatory reforms after the crisis. The book’s thought-provoking and sometimes controversial views are very welcome to the discussion even if one would not necessarily agree with all of them.” —Erkki Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland
Since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, central banking has changed dramatically. Over the past five years central banks have intervened in both public and private debt markets, taking on functions of dealers of last resort, while simultaneously designing regulatory and resolution frameworks with the explicit aim of changing bank business models, all in order to contain and better address systemic risk. This book explores these developments through collected essays from authors from both academia and policy circles, and sets them in the context of the European crisis.
‘Central Banking at a Crossroads’ reflects on the innovations central banks have made to improve their modes of intervention, regulation and resolution of financial markets and financial institutions in four related sections: ‘Bank Capital Regulation’ examines the Basel III agreement, identifying its key novelties and shortcomings vis-à-vis its predecessor, Basel II; ‘Bank Resolution’ focuses on effective regimes for regulating and resolving ailing banks; ‘Central Banking with Collateral-Based Finance’ develops thought on the challenges that market-based finance pose for the conduct of central banking in periods of economic stability and, through a critical theoretical angle, the important role that governments play for financial markets as manufacturers of high-quality collateral or safe assets; and, finally, ‘Where Next for Central Banking’ examines the trajectory of central banking, its issues, and its new, central role in sustaining capitalism.
Charles Goodhart is director of the Financial Regulation Research Programme at the London School of Economics.
Daniela Gabor is an associate professor at the University of the West of England in Bristol.
Jakob Vestergaard is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Denmark.
Ismail Ertürk is a senior lecturer at Manchester Business School at the University of Manchester, UK.
“Big crises challenge our thinking and even entire paradigms of economics. Many of the authors in this volume are well known for their ideas for further regulatory reforms after the crisis. The book’s thought-provoking and sometimes controversial views are very welcome to the discussion even if one would not necessarily agree with all of them.” —Erkki Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland
“Focusing on solvency questions, this book provides a representative sample of the current state of debate, a first and useful step in the urgent project of reconceptualizing the role of central banking for the modern world.” —Perry Mehrling, Barnard College, Columbia University
“This is the book finance experts have been waiting for. For those who seek concrete case studies and empirics on the transformative role of central banks since the financial crisis, this important volume amply fills this niche. This rigorous and novel investigation is a ‘must-read’ for all who either approve or disapprove of the unconventional instruments and practices used by central banks that have extended the mandate and blurred the traditional line between monetary and fiscal policy.” —Brigitte Young, University of Münster, Germany
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Central Banking at a Crossroads | i | ||
Title | iii | ||
Copyright | iv | ||
CONTENTS | v | ||
PREFACE | vii | ||
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 | ||
Background and Key Themes | 1 | ||
Overview of Chapters | 4 | ||
References | 11 | ||
Part 1 BANK CAPITAL REGULATION | 13 | ||
Chapter 2 CONSTRAINING DISCRETION IN BANK REGULATION | 15 | ||
Introduction | 15 | ||
The Emergence of Self-Regulation | 15 | ||
Unfulfilled Ambitions | 17 | ||
Unintended Consequences | 24 | ||
Where Next? | 27 | ||
Conclusion | 29 | ||
Notes | 30 | ||
References | 30 | ||
Chapter 3 FALLACIES AND IRRELEVANT FACTS IN THE DISCUSSION ON CAPITAL REGULATION | 33 | ||
Introduction | 33 | ||
Capital Structure Fallacies | 34 | ||
Arguments Based on a Confusion of Private and Social Costs | 39 | ||
Equity Requirements and Bank Lending | 42 | ||
Policy Recommendations | 44 | ||
Concluding Remarks | 46 | ||
Notes | 47 | ||
References | 48 | ||
Chapter 4 COMPLEXITY, INTERCONNECTEDNESS: BUSINESS MODELS AND THE BASEL SYSTEM | 51 | ||
Abstract | 51 | ||
I. Introduction | 51 | ||
II. The Basel System Historically | 52 | ||
III. The Basel III Reforms | 54 | ||
IV. New Empirical Evidence on Leverage and Interconnectedness Risk | 65 | ||
Modeling the DTD | 66 | ||
Concluding Remarks | 70 | ||
Notes | 71 | ||
References | 72 | ||
Chapter 5 AT THE BRINK OF INSOLVENCY: SHALLOW RECAPITALIZATION EXERCISE FAILS TO BOLSTER EUROPE’S AILING BANKS | 75 | ||
I. Introduction | 75 | ||
II. Stress Tests and Recapitalization Exercises | 76 | ||
III. The Continued Undercapitalization of European Banking | 79 | ||
IV. European Recapitalization in Perspective | 84 | ||
V. The CRD4: Institutionalizing the Reluctance to Recapitalize? | 86 | ||
Discussion | 88 | ||
VI. Concluding Remarks | 89 | ||
Notes | 91 | ||
References | 91 | ||
Part 2 BANK RESOLUTION | 95 | ||
Chapter 6 BANK RESOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: WHAT LESSONS FOR EUROPE? | 97 | ||
Introduction | 97 | ||
What Should Happen? | 99 | ||
What May Go Wrong and What to Do About It | 99 | ||
Conclusions | 105 | ||
Notes | 106 | ||
References | 107 | ||
Chapter 7 RESOLVING PROBLEM BANKS: A REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL EVIDENCE | 109 | ||
Introduction | 109 | ||
The Case for Special Resolution Regimes | 109 | ||
Changes in Resolution Regimes during the Global Financial Crisis | 111 | ||
Principles and Design of the Framework | 112 | ||
Beyond the Special Resolution Regime | 117 | ||
Cross-Border Issues | 119 | ||
Conclusion | 120 | ||
Notes | 120 | ||
References | 121 | ||
Chapter 8 BANK RESOLUTION IN NEW ZEALAND AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE | 123 | ||
Splitting the Bank | 125 | ||
Can One Ignore the Australians? | 126 | ||
Bailing In | 128 | ||
Swift Action | 132 | ||
An Error over Deposit Insurance | 133 | ||
Concluding Remarks | 135 | ||
Notes | 136 | ||
References | 138 | ||
Part 3 CENTRAL BANKING WITH \nCOLLATERAL-BASED FINANCE | 141 | ||
Chapter 9 COLLATERAL AND MONETARY POLICY | 143 | ||
Introduction | 143 | ||
Price of Money and Price of Collateral | 144 | ||
The Changing Collateral Space | 145 | ||
Collateral and Monetary Policy, via the IS/LM Framework | 150 | ||
The Collateral Implications of Exit Strategies | 153 | ||
Conclusion | 155 | ||
Notes | 155 | ||
References | 156 | ||
Chapter 10 THE ECB AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLATERAL | 157 | ||
Introduction | 157 | ||
Theoretical Perspectives: Central Banks’ Intervention in Financial Markets | 158 | ||
Understanding the ECB’s Dilemmas | 168 | ||
Conclusion | 173 | ||
Notes | 174 | ||
References | 174 | ||
Chapter 11 THE BACKSTORY OF THE RISK-FREE ASSET: HOW GOVERNMENT DEBT BECAME “SAFE” | 177 | ||
I. Introduction | 177 | ||
II. The Mystery/History of Sovereign Safety | 178 | ||
III. Fiction and Public Credit | 181 | ||
IV. Conclusion | 184 | ||
Notes | 184 | ||
References | 185 | ||
Part 4 WHERE NEXT FOR CENTRAL BANKING? | 189 | ||
Chapter 12 CENTRAL BANKING POST-CRISIS: WHAT COMPASS FOR UNCHARTED WATERS? | 191 | ||
Introduction | 191 | ||
I. The Evolving Intellectual Backdrop | 192 | ||
II. A Way Forward? Working Hypotheses | 195 | ||
III. A Way Forward? Implications for Central Banking | 199 | ||
Postscript | 203 | ||
I. Some Stylized Facts | 203 | ||
II. How Far Has the Compass Provided Guidance? | 205 | ||
III. Assessment of Outcomes and Risks | 206 | ||
Conclusion | 209 | ||
Notes | 209 | ||
References | 211 | ||
Chapter 13 RECONCEPTUALIZING CENTRAL BANK UNCONVENTIONAL POLICIES: LONG POSITIONS ON NO-GROWTH CAPITALISM | 217 | ||
Convergence to Central Bank Unconventional Policies in Core Capitalist Countries after the 2007 Crisis | 217 | ||
The Rise of Unconventional Central Bank Policies | 218 | ||
Central Banks’ Long Position on a Low-Growth Capitalism | 221 | ||
Large-Scale Asset Purchases as a Long Position on Low-Growth Capitalism | 223 | ||
Conclusion | 226 | ||
References | 228 | ||
Chapter 14 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRAL BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS: WHAT ARE CENTRAL BANKS FOR? | 229 | ||
Introduction | 229 | ||
Banking History and the Role of Collateral | 230 | ||
Central Banks and Financial Stability | 232 | ||
Central Bank Independence | 236 | ||
Conclusion | 241 | ||
Notes | 241 | ||
References | 242 | ||
Chapter 15 IS NEW GOVERNANCE THE IDEAL ARCHITECTURE FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION? | 245 | ||
Introduction: Regulatory Pluralism and the Interrelationship of Legal Regimes | 245 | ||
Part II: The FSB Approach to Global Financial Architecture | 247 | ||
Part III: The New Governance Approach | 253 | ||
Part IV: New Governance in Practice: A Critical Appraisal | 255 | ||
Part V: Conclusion | 259 | ||
Note | 262 | ||
References | 262 | ||
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS | 265 | ||
INDEX | 271 |