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Cognitive Psychology

Cognitive Psychology

Philip Quinlan | Ben Dyson

(2010)

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Book Details

Abstract

Cognitive Psychology provides a lively and engaging introduction to this field and offers complete coverage of all the British Psychological Society (BPS) required topics. This text provides a clear and detailed account of key experiments, theories and concepts, and the examples, full colour photos and illustrations found throughout animate theoretical discussion and enable students to grasp the practical applications of Cognitive Psychology.

 

 


Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Cover Cover
Cognitive Psychology i
Brief contents vii
Contents ix
List of figures and tables xxiv
Guided tour xxx
Preface xxxv
Acknowledgements xxxvii
About the authors xxxviii
Foundations 1
Learning Objectives\r 1
Chapter Contents\r 1
‘If you don’t believe, she won’t come’ Playground hypothesising about the tooth fairy 2
Reflective Questions\r 3
Part 1 An historical perspective and why there is more to cognitive psychology than meets the eye 3
Introduction and preliminary considerations 3
The abstract nature of cognitive psychology 4
Dualism and one of the many mind/body problems 5
Behaviourism 6
The laws of behaviour 6
The principles of associationism 7
Associative processes and learning about causation 8
Some general points about behaviourism 8
Research focus 1.1 Are you looking at me? The role of race when fear stares you in the face 9
Methodological behaviourism 10
Behaviourism and free will 10
Behaviourism and the science of psychology 11
Logical behaviourism 11
Criticisms of logical behaviourism 12
‘Testability is falsifiability’: cognitive psychology and theory testing 13
Occam’s Razor: the beauty of simplicity 14
Simplicity and the thermostat 14
Simplicity and cognitive theory 15
Research focus 1.2 Reefer madness: behavioural solutions to marijuana problems 17
PART 2 An introduction to the nature of explanation in cognitive psychology 17
How the mind and the brain are related 18
Central state identity theory 18
Type identity theory 18
The different brains problem 19
Token identity theory 19
Function and functional role 20
Functionalism 21
Flow charts of the mind: distinctions between mind, brain, software and hardware 21
Functional description and a return to the thermostat 22
Functionalism and information processing systems 23
Marr’s levels of explanation and cognitive psychology 24
The level of the computational theory 24
The level of the representation and the algorithm 24
The level of the hardware 24
Levels of explanation and information processing systems 25
Research focus 1.3 What’s a computer? Half a century playing the imitation game 26
Levels of explanation and reductionism 26
Concluding comments 27
Chapter Summary 28
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 30
Information Processing and Nature of the Mind 31
Learning Objectives 31
Chapter Contents 31
Hold the bells! The unfortunate case of the modular fruit machine 32
Reflective Questions 32
Part 1 An introduction to computation and cognitive psychology 33
Introduction and preliminary considerations 33
Different methodological approaches to the study of the mind 34
The cognitive approach 35
The artificial intelligence approach 35
The neuroscience approach 36
Information theory and information processing 37
A brief introduction to information theory 37
Information and the notion o fredundancy 38
Information theory and human information processing 38
The computational metaphor of mind and human cognition 40
The naked desktop: the internal workings of a digital computer laid bare 40
Physical symbol systems 41
Symbolic representation 41
Symbolic representation and memory 42
Information processing and the internal set of operations 43
Control 43
The special nature of minds and computers 44
Rule-following vs. rule-governed systems 44
Mental computation 46
The formality condition 46
The formality condition and strong AI 47
PART 2 So what is the mind really like? 49
Marr’s principle of modular design 49
Research focus 2.1 We are not amusia-ed: is music modularised? 50
Other conceptions of modularity 51
The nature of horizontal faculties 51
The nature of vertical faculties: a different kind of pot head 52
Fodor’s modules 53
How is it best to characterise modules? 54
Modularity and cognitive neuropsychology 55
Cognitive neuropsychology 55
Research focus 2.2 Life after trauma: the astonishing case of Phineas Gage and the iron rod 56
The logic of the cognitive neuropsychological approach 57
Association deficits 57
Dissociation deficits 58
Cognitive deficits and cognitive resources 58
Double dissociations 58
Research focus 2.3 It’s rude to point: double dissociations and manual behaviour 59
Concluding comments 61
Chapter Summary 62
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 63
Visual Processes and Visual Sensory Memory 64
Learning Objectives 64
Chapter Contents 64
Catching the last bus home? 65
Reflective Questions 65
Introduction and preliminary considerations 65
An introduction to sensory memory 66
Visual sensory memory: iconic memory 67
Early experimental investigations of iconic memory 68
Research focus 3.1 Blinking heck! What happens to iconic memory when you blink? 72
Iconic memory and visual masking 73
Iconic memory and visible persistence 76
Visible vs. informational persistence 77
Puzzling findings and the traditional icon 80
The ‘eye-as-a-camera’ view of visual perception 83
The discrete moment and the travelling moment hypotheses 84
Icons as retinal snapshots 86
Coding in the visual system 87
Visual frames of reference 88
Research focus 3.2 Honk if you can hear me: listening to trains inside cars 91
Turvey’s (1973) experiments on masking 92
Visual masking and the organisation of the visual system 92
Further evidence on where the icon is 96
Research focus 3.3 Going, going, gone: iconic memory in dementia patients 97
Iconic memory and the more durable store 98
Aperture viewing 98
Concluding comments 101
Chapter Summary 102
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 104
Masking, Thresholds and Consciousness 105
Learning Objectives 105
Chapter Contents 105
While you were sleeping The continuing joys of communal living 106
Reflective Questions 106
Introduction and preliminary considerations 107
The sequential account of processing and Turvey’s work on visual masking 108
The concurrent and contingent model of masking 108
Masking by object substitution 110
Feedforward and feedback processes 111
Feedback as re-entrant visual processes 111
Masking and consciousness 113
Semantic activation without conscious identification? 113
Allport (1977) 114
Problems for Allport (1977) and a re-interpretation of his data 115
Drawing the line between conscious and non-conscious processing 115
Perceptual thresholds 116
Thresholds and conscious perception 118
Research focus 4.1 Did you say something? Subliminal priming in audition 119
The traditional view of an absolute threshold 120
Variable thresholds and subjective factors 120
Thresholds and perceptual defence 122
Research focus 4.2 Slap or tickle: do we have a preference for the detection of negative or positive words? 123
Perceptual defence: a perceptual effect? 124
Thresholds and signal detection theory 125
The traditional interpretation of SDT in information processing terms 128
Perceptual defence a perceptual effect? Broadbent and Gregory (1967a) revisited 129
More recent accounts of semantic activation without conscious identification 131
Marcel’s work on semantic activation without conscious identification 131
Perception without awareness? A re-appraisal of Marcel’s findings 132
Cheesman and Merikle (1984) 133
Research focus 4.3 Paying your way into consciousness: can post-decision wagers measure awareness? 135
Perception without awareness? More provocative evidence 137
Just how effective is visual masking in halting stimulus processing? 138
Concluding comments 140
Chapter Summary 140
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 142
An Introduction to Perception 143
Learning Objectives 143
Chapter Contents 143
‘It only attacks when the moon is aglow’ The Beast of Burnley 144
Reflective Questions 144
Introduction and preliminary considerations 144
Distinguishing perception from cognition 145
Drawing a distinction between the perceptual system and the cognitive system 147
Familiarity and perception 148
Familiarity and word recognition 149
Sensory/perceptual accounts of the effects of familiarity 150
Decisional/post-perceptual accounts of familiarity 151
Explaining the word frequency effect 152
Active vs. passive theories of perception 152
Familiarity effects reflect late processes 152
Familiarity effects reflect early processes 153
Recency and expectancy 157
The perception of ambiguous figures 157
Research focus 5.1 Flip-flopping: children’s responses to ambiguous figures 158
Attempting to disentangle effects of recency from those of expectancy 159
Recency and repetition priming 160
Expectancy and set 162
Instructional set 163
Mental set 163
More general conclusions 165
The Old Look/New Look schools in perception 166
The Old Look: Gestalt theory 166
The Gestalt laws of perceptual organisation 167
The Principle of Prägnanz 168
Gestalt theory and the brain 168
Mental copies and perceptualorganisation 170
Research focus 5.2 The gestation of Gestalt: how infants learn to group perceptually 170
The New Look 172
Bruner’s perceptual readiness theory 172
Perception as a process of unconscious inference 173
The likelihood principle 173
The poverty of the stimulus argument 174
Perceptual inference-making 174
Research focus 5.3 You saw the whole of the cube: spatial neglect and Necker drawings 175
Lessons from perceptual illusions 176
Modularity revisited 179
Bottom-up vs. top-down modes of processing 180
Concluding comments 181
Chapter Summary 182
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 183
Theories of Perception 185
Learning Objectives 185
Chapter Contents 185
But is it art? Aesthetic observations and Twiglets 186
Reflective Questions 186
Introduction and preliminary considerations 186
Simplicity and likelihood 187
The minimum principle 187
Critical appraisal of SIT 190
The likelihood principle 191
Simplicity and likelihood reconsidered 193
Simplicity, likelihood and the nature of perception 193
Are short codes all they are cracked up to be? 193
The advantages of the likelihood principle 194
Global-to-local processing 196
Experiments with compound letters 197
Accounting for global-to-local processing 198
Navon’s (2003) account of global-to-local processing 200
Change blindness 202
Research focus 6.1 Touchy touchy: the inability to detect changes in the tactile modality 204
Context effects in perception 206
Context in the perception of speech 207
Analysis by synthesis and speech perception 208
Initial appraisal of analysis by synthesis 209
Research focus 6.2 Hear my lips: visual and auditory dominance in the McGurk effect 212
Perception as a process of embellishment 213
Minsky’s (1975) frame theory 213
Problems for knowledge-driven accounts of perception 214
Phonemic restoration as an act of perceptual embellishment 216
Detailed theoretical accounts of performance 217
Research focus 6.3 Sorry, I’ll read that again: phonemic restoration with the initial phoneme 218
Top-down processing and interactive activation models 218
Interactive activation and phonemic restoration 220
Samuel’s findings 220
Perception as constrained hallucination? 221
Pulling it all together 223
Embellishment in perception revisited 223
Top-down influences in perception revisited 224
Concluding comments 225
Chapter Summary 225
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 227
Mental Representation 228
Learning Objectives 228
Chapter Contents 228
You are nothing! 229
Reflective Questions 229
Introduction and preliminary considerations 230
How rats running mazes led to some insights about mental representation 230
Maps and cognitive maps 231
Analogical representation 232
Research focus 7.1 Is 8 to 9 further than 10 to 9? Representing the mental number line 236
Tolman’s alternative theoretical perspective to behaviourism 237
Some examples of Tolman’s experiments on cognitive maps 238
Mental operations carried out on mental maps 240
Research focus 7.2 You can’t get there from here: the cognitive map of a brain-damaged London taxi driver 242
Maps and pictures-in-the-head 242
Mental pictures 242
Kosslyn’s view of mental pictures 244
Mental images and the mental cathode-ray screen 244
Dual-format systems 245
Mental scanning 246
Further provocative data 248
Real space in the head: what is mental space really like? 249
Further evidence for analogical representation 249
The dissenting view: descriptive, not depictive representations 250
Depictive representations and a pause for thought 251
The ambiguity of mental images 252
Mental rotation 255
Research focus 7.3 Monkey see, monkey do, monkey rotate? The mental life of a macaque 257
Descriptive representations 258
Mentalese – the language of thought 258
Structural descriptions of shapes 259
Shape discriminations and template matching 262
The lingua mentis and propositional representation 263
Concluding comments 267
Chapter Summary 268
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 270
Attention: General introduction, basic models and data 271
Learning Objectives 271
Chapter Contents 271
A cognitive psychologist in the DJ booth 272
Reflective Questions 273
Introduction and preliminary considerations 273
Out with the new and in with the old 273
Early filtering accounts of selection 274
Selection by filtering 275
Information processing constraints in the model 277
Split-span experiments 278
Shadowing experiments 280
Provocative data – challenges to the early filter account 280
Research focus 8.1 I think my ears are burning: why do I hear my name across a crowded room? 281
The attenuated filter model of attention 283
Further revisions to the original filter theory 283
The differences between stimulus set and response set 284
Late filtering accounts of selection 285
Evidence in support of late selection 286
No ‘structural bottleneck’ accounts of attention 288
The notion of attentional resources 290
A single pool of resources? 290
Single resource accounts and the dual-task decrement 291
Research focus 8.2 Patting my head and rubbing my belly: can I really do two things at once? 292
Appraisal of single resource theories 293
Resources and resource allocation in more detail 295
Attentional resources or something else? 296
Multiple resources? 299
Research focus 8.3‘ Sorry, I can’t speak now, I’m in the hospital’: mobile phone use and driving as dual task 300
When doing two things at once is as easy as doing either alone 300
Pulling it all together 302
Controlled parallel processing 304
Perceptual load theory 305
Load theory and effects of varying perceptual load 306
Load theory and effects of varying memory load 307
Concluding comments 309
Chapter Summary 309
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 310
Attentional Constraints and Performance Limitations 312
Learning Objectives 312
Chapter Contents 312
Back in the booth 313
Reflective Questions 313
Introduction and preliminary considerations 313
Stages of information processing 314
Further analyses of dual-task performance 316
Research focus 9.1 Counting the cost: Alzheimer’s disease and dual-task performance 317
Studies of the psychological refractory period 317
Understanding the PRP 319
Pashler’s (1994) four principles of the central bottleneck theory 320
Testing the principles of the central bottleneck account 322
Additivity and under-additivity on RT2 323
Standing back from the central bottlenecks 328
Capacity sharing? 328
PRP and driving 329
Research focus 9.2 Because practice makes . . . : PRP, practice and the elderly 330
Task switching 331
Basic concepts and findings from the task-switching literature 331
Task set reconfiguration 333
Some additional theoretical ideas 336
The task carryover account 336
Switching costs and proactive interference 337
Research focus 9.3 Totally wired? The effect of caffeine on task switching 338
Concluding comments 339
Chapter Summary 339
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 340
Human Memory: An Introduction 342
Learning Objectives 342
Chapter Contents 342
You must remember this? A levels of processing approach to exam cramming 343
Reflective Questions 343
Introduction and preliminary considerations 343
Libraries/warehouses/computers 345
The modularity of mind revisited 346
Memory as a horizontal faculty 346
Organisation and memory 349
Organisation vs. associations? 351
The levels of processing approach 351
Problems with levels and alternative accounts 352
Compartmentalisation of memory 354
Episodic vs. semantic memory 354
Further evidence for the episodic/semantic distinction 355
Further divisions between memory systems 356
Short-term and long-term memory 356
Forgetting and short-term memory 358
Research focus 10.1 Playing tag on . . . which street? Childhood memories for street names 359
Further evidence for trace decay 360
Further evidence that bears on the short-term/long-term memory distinction 364
The modal model and its detractors 367
Arguments about recency effects 368
Research focus 10.2 Faithful all ye come: serial position effects in hymns 370
Alternative accounts of the recency effects 370
Memory as a vertical faculty 374
The working memory model 374
Visuo-spatial, short-term memory 378
The central executive 379
Research focus 10.3 Standing in the way of control: restarting the central executive after brain injury 380
The episodic buffer 382
Concluding comments 383
Chapter Summary 384
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 385
Human Memory: Fallibilities and failures 387
Learning Objectives 387
Chapter Contents 387
Night 388
Reflective Questions 388
Introduction and preliminary considerations 388
Headed records 389
Headed records and various memory phenomena 390
Eyewitness memory 391
Reconstructive and destructive processes: the misleading information effect 392
Research focus 11.1 But I heard them with my own ears! An exploration in earwitness testimony 393
Headed records and the misleading information effect 393
Alternative accounts of the misleading information effect 395
Further evidence that bears on destructive processes 396
The misleading information effect and encoding specificity 397
Going beyond encoding specificity 398
Research focus 11.2 Do you remember the first time? Remembering misleading information about upcoming novel events 399
Even more accounts of the misleading information effect 400
Signal detection theory, recognition memory and explaining false memories 400
False memories and response bias 403
False memories in the real world 405
Research focus 11.3 Remembering the mothership: false memories and alien abductees 407
False memories and aging 408
False autobiographical memories 411
Memory and the remember/know distinction 412
Concluding comments 413
Chapter Summary 414
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 415
Semantic Memory and Concepts 416
Learning Objectives 416
Chapter Contents 416
Wardrobe refreshing and memories of the Pyramid stage 417
Reflective Questions 417
Introduction and preliminary considerations 418
Key terms and key concepts 418
Extensions and intensions 419
Propositions and propositional networks 421
Semantic network representations of human memory 422
Semantic networks 423
A psychologically plausible semantic network? 426
Data that challenge the Collins and Quillian account 428
Feature models 430
Psychological space and multidimensional scaling 430
Research focus 12.1 ‘I think I’m gonna barf’: the different dimensions of disgust 432
The Smith et al. (1974) featural model 432
Difficult findings for the featural account 434
Research focus 12.2 Do geese or squirrels lay eggs? Semantic memory in a schizophrenic 435
Semantic features, semantic primitives and cogits 436
Semantic features as defined on semantic dimensions 436
Semantic primitives as the atoms of meaning 436
Semantic features and semantic feature norms 437
Semantic features and semantic relatedness 437
Localist vs. distributed models 441
Distributed representation and mental chemistry 442
The Rumelhart and Todd (1993) model of semantic memory 444
Connectionist models and the simulation of knowledge acquisition 445
Training connectionist networks 446
Hidden unit representations 449
Research focus 12.3 What should I call you? Networks, nominal competition and naming 452
Prototypes 453
Early experimental work on prototypes 454
Conceptual categories and family resemblance 455
Prototype formation 456
The internal structure of mental taxonomies 457
The basic level and the structure of mental categories 457
Prototype models vs. exemplar-based models 459
Concluding comments 460
Chapter Summary 461
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 462
Object Recognition 464
Learning Objectives 464
Chapter Contents 464
But mine was small, grey and shiny as well Disputes at baggage carousel number 6 465
Reflective Questions 465
Introduction and preliminary considerations 466
A general framework for thinking about object recognition 467
Sorting out ‘recognition’, ‘identification’ and ‘classification’ 467
The basic level advantage 468
The crude-to-fine framework reappears 469
Further claims about the basic level advantage and perceptual processing 470
The basic level advantage and expertise 471
Experts and ‘experts’ 472
Research focus 13.1 Knowing your plonk from your plink: what makes a wine expert? 474
Further issues and controversies in visual object recognition 475
Additional useful terminology: introduction to Marr’s theory 477
2D representations 477
21–2 D representations 477
Marr’s levels of representation in vision 478
The catalogue of 3D models 479
Object recognition and the process of matching 481
Object recognition and axis-based descriptions 481
Connections with the previous material 483
The basic first hypothesis revisited 483
Object recognition via the recognition of part of an object 483
Empirical evidence that bears on Marr’s theory 483
Can we imagine how objects look from other viewpoints? 484
Research focus 13.2 ‘Narrowing towards the back’: foreshortening without sight 489
Restricted viewpoint-invarian ttheories 490
Biederman’s recognition by components account 491
Appraisal of RBC 494
Viewpoint-dependent theories 496
Privileged view or privileged views? 498
The chorus of prototypes 499
Research focus 13.3 Meet the Greebles: the effects of training on an individual with visual agnosia 502
Evidence regarding context and object recognition 503
Concluding comments 506
Chapter Summary 507
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 508
The Nature of Language and Its Relation to the Other Mental Faculties 509
Learning Objectives 509
Chapter Contents 509
Off the starting blocks Language on a lazy Sunday afternoon 510
Reflective Questions 510
Introduction and preliminary considerations 511
Some basic characteristics of natural language 511
Performance vs. competence 511
The difference between the surface forms of language and the deeper forms 513
Linguistics vs. psycholinguistics 514
The componential nature of language 515
The phonological structure 515
The syntactic structure 515
The semantic structure 517
Research focus 14.1 I know it, I know it, it’s on the tip of my fingers: failure of sign retrieval in the deaf 519
Other basic characteristics of natural language 519
Productivity 520
Systematicity 520
Compositionality 521
Recursion 521
Syntactic parsing on-line 524
Syntax and the garden path 524
Research focus 14.2 While Anna dressed the baby spit up on the bed: what we believe happened as we walk down the garden path 526
Parsing according to minimal attachment 527
Parsing according to late closure 529
Multiple-constraint satisfaction accounts of parsing: semantically driven parsing 530
Mental rules 532
Rule-following vs. rule-governed devices reconsidered 533
The past-tense debate 533
The establishment account of past-tense learning 534
Connectionist accounts of past-tense learning 535
Past-tense learning according to Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) 535
Research focus 14.3 Holded the front page! Sex differences in past-tense overgeneralisations 539
Appraising the Rumelhart and McClelland past-tense model 540
Language, knowledge and perception 542
A final general framework for thinking about the relations between language and the other related faculties 542
Language, mental categories and perception 544
Influences of categorisation on perceptual discrimination – Goldstone (1994) 544
Categorical perception and verbal labelling 547
Categorical perception, colour perception and colour naming 549
The Whorf hypothesis vs. the Roschian hypothesis 549
The early work of Heider/Rosch 550
More recent work by Roberson and colleagues 551
Concluding comments 553
Chapter Summary 554
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 556
Reasoning 557
Learning Objectives 557
Chapter Contents 557
A day at the races 558
Reflective Questions 558
Introduction and preliminary considerations 559
The dual system account of reasoning 559
The associative system 559
The rule-based system 559
Distinguishing between the two systems 560
Linda-the-bank-teller problem 560
The conjunction fallacy and representativeness 561
Reasoning by heuristics and biases 562
The representative heuristic 563
The availability heuristic 563
Base rate neglect 564
Research focus 15.1 You are either with us or against us: the heuristics of terror 566
The medical diagnosis problem 567
Heuristics and biases and the competence/performance distinction 570
The standard picture 570
Why people are not Bayesian reasoners 571
Natural frequencies vs. conditional probabilities 572
The two systems of reasoning revisited 574
Reasoning in evolutionary terms 575
Evolution and the dual systems 575
Evolution and reasoning the fast and frugal way 576
Human reasoning as a process of satisficing 576
Research focus 15.2 When enough is enough: satisficing, maximising and the way you feel 577
Evolution and the modularity of mind 579
Deductive and inductive inference 580
Deductive inference 580
Inductive inference 580
The Wason selection task 581
Social contract theory 583
Feeling obliged? Deontic and indicative conditionals 585
The selection task and attempts to eliminate system 2 585
Appraising the information gain account 587
Deductive reasoning and syllogisms 589
Some definitions and useful terminology 589
Psychological aspects of syllogistic reasoning 591
The figural effect and mental models 592
Research focus 15.3 Looking at the evidence: eye movements and syllogistic reasoning 595
Mental models and mental imagery 596
Concluding comments 597
Chapter Summary 598
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 599
Cognition and Emotion 600
Learning Objectives 600
Chapter Contents 600
Master of your mood? 601
Reflective Questions 601
Introduction and preliminary considerations 601
Towards a cognitive theory of emotions 603
The ‘five’ basic emotions 604
Emotional vs. non-emotional modes of the cognitive system 604
Research focus 16.1 If you’re happy and you know it, press a key: cultural differences in recognising basic emotions 605
Conscious versus unconscious processing 607
Automatic vs. controlled processes 608
Searching for emotionally charged stimuli 609
The face-in-the-crowd effect 609
Further work on the face-in-the-crowd effect 613
Appraisal of the work on facial expression detection 617
Other attentional tasks and facial expression processing 617
Research focus 16.2 Going for gold? What your face looks like when you come second 618
The flanker task and emotional faces 619
Eye gaze, facial expression and the direction of attention 621
The basic spatial cueing task 621
Explaining spatial cueing 624
Covert vs. overt shifts of attention 624
Experimental work on following eye gaze 625
Further experiments on the potency of eye gaze 626
Detecting threatening objects 629
Further evidence for the animal advantage 630
Research focus 16.3 Freeze! Coming face to face with threat 631
Other indications of the influence of emotion on cognition 632
Mood induction in ‘normal, healthy adults’ 632
Mood induction and ethical considerations 633
‘Mood’ induction and ‘mood’ 633
Mood and judgement 635
Depressive realism 635
Further work on depressive realism 636
Concluding comments 637
Chapter Summary 638
Answers to Pinpoint Questions 640
Bibliography 641
Glossary 665
Name index 681
Subject index 688
Publisher’s acknowledgements 699